

IS THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND U.S.-MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA POLICY

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

Serial No. 109-210

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international_relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

29-882PDF

WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, *Chairman*

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa	TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, <i>Vice Chairman</i>	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana	GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California	ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida	DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California	SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
PETER T. KING, New York	BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio	ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
THOMAS G. TANCREDI, Colorado	ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas	WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
DARRELL ISSA, California	GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	BARBARA LEE, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia	JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin	EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY WELLER, Illinois	SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
MIKE PENCE, Indiana	GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida	DIANE E. WATSON, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas	BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina	BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CONNIE MACK, Florida	DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska	RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas	
TED POE, Texas	

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., *Staff Director/General Counsel*

ROBERT R. KING, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, *Chair*

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, <i>Vice Chair</i>	GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas	JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
CONNIE MACK, Florida	SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia	BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
MIKE PENCE, Indiana	DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida	RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
DARRELL ISSA, California	

YLEEM POBLETE, *Subcommittee Staff Director*

YEVGENY GUREVICH, *Professional Staff Member*

DAVID ADAMS, *Democratic Professional Staff Member*

LEE COHEN, *Staff Associate*

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Mr. Tony Blankley, Editorial Editor, "The Washington Times"	6
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Director, Turkish Research Program, The Washington Institute for Near East	19
Mr. Steven Simon, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations	27
Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D., Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, The Hudson Institute	34
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING	
Mr. Tony Blankley: Prepared statement	8
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	23
Mr. Steven Simon: Prepared statement	30
Hillel Fradkin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement	38

IS THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS? ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND U.S.-MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA POLICY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND CENTRAL ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will begin. Thank you, Congressman Berman, for being here, and the President is addressing the Republican Caucus, so a lot of folks are going to come in a little bit later. Thank you to the panelists and thank you for the audience as well.

A few days ago, we commemorated a solemn anniversary—the fifth anniversary of the deplorable attacks against our nation.

Five years ago, our eyes could not accept the images being shown around the world. Our mind could not fathom the hatred that could drive these individuals to kill thousands of innocent human beings. At first, we were surprised, but we quickly turned to sorrow, to dismay, to anger and we turned that into a catalyst for action—a strategy to fight the enemy wherever it rears its head.

Central to defeating the fanatics is the realization that we are facing an enemy that has declared a full-fledged war on us and is determined to destroy Western civilization and the principles upon which it is based.

To defeat this enemy, and ensure that freedom prevails today, as a democracy prevailed over communism in the last century, we must truly understand the nature of the evolving enemy. We must understand the mindset of those radicals—their rulers, their view of the battlefield—in order for our strategies to be truly effective.

Are we, in fact, engaged in a clash of civilizations with the Middle East and Central Asia as the central front in this struggle?

What should U.S. policy focus on in order to fight these Islamic extremist's mounting offensive against those who refuse to espouse their radical theologies?

According to Samuel Huntington, the creator of the “class of civilization” theory, the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War period, will be triggered by cultural and religious conflicts, rather than political and economic ones. The principal conflicts will

occur between groups of “different civilizations.” In particular, Huntington states that the conflicts will occur between the recent emergence of radical Islam and terrorism as well as with the “long history of confrontation between the Middle East and Europe.”

Some question the applicability of this theory to the current struggle against Islamist terrorism, given the absence of a core state. But what of state-sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria? How should we view Iran’s longstanding desire to export its Islamic revolution and exert itself as a regional, if not global, power? How does Iran affect the ideology of destruction espoused by the jihadists?

Others who disagree with Huntington’s theory argue that his analysis overly generalizes Islam, and overlooks important cultural, religious, and ethnic differences between Muslims.

One such critic is Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum and a prize-winning columnist. Pipes opposes Huntington’s theory that Islam is fundamentally at odds with Western civilization, and argues that the problem is rooted in radical Islam rather than Islam as a whole.

Others, such as Dr. Wafa Sultan, described the current struggle as “a battle between modernity and barbarism.” Dr. Wafa Sultan is a Syrian-American psychiatrist who has debated frequently on al-Jazeera and is facing constant death threats and security concerns for her criticism of radical Islam.

Mr. Tony Blankley, one of our distinguished panelists today, notes that the radical Muslim fundamentalists are “postmodern, not pre-modern. they are designing a distinctly Western fascist version of Islam that is less and less connected to the Islam of their Middle East homeland.”

But there are degrees of radicalism. Some are prepared to murder in what they feel is their religious duty. Other are supportive or protective of these jihadists. Still others do not embrace the tactics employed by the jihadists but share their convictions and perceptions of the extremists.

Thus, how can U.S. strategies be crafted to address these different levels of involvement and support?

For example, experts say that many Islamic terrorist groups pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda but are not directly linked to this terrorist entity. What is it that binds them to al-Qaeda? What is it about bin Laden, or other extremist Islamist terrorist leaders, or the ideology itself that attacks the recruits? How much of the ideology of destruction that drives these Islamofascists is rooted in faith? In politics? In personal vengeance for any socio-economic ills that may have befallen the jihadists or their relatives?

Is one entity focused on the global strategy while other Islamist terrorist groups use that to achieve individual, or country-specific objectives?

Ultimately, according to Huntington, the reality we face is: “A West at the peak of its power confronting non-West that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”

But is it the West in the traditional sense that is the target or is the target the growing coalition of democracies and governments aspiring to create free, democratic societies?

In short, who and what is the enemy? What emboldens and strengthens the enemy? What can undermine and destroy the enemy in the long term?

We hope that today's discussions, taking place in the shadow of the fifth anniversary of the September 11th attacks, will help us remember the brutal nature of these extremists and will provide us greater insight into their nature, in order to refine our policies and defeat them.

We must never, never forget. We must remain vigilant. The enemy is just waiting for us to flinch before its agents descend like vultures to prey on our weakness.

We thank the witnesses for appearing before us today and we honor all who are at the forefront of this battle of ideas. With that, I would like to turn to the Ranking Member of our Committee, my Co-Chair, Mr. Ackerman of New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

The 5-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks is an appropriate point for us to pause and take stock of the war against terrorism, but I find the subject of today's hearing, is there a clash of civilizations, in itself alarming. I see two possibilities.

One, that 5 years into this conflict we need to have a hearing to help define and describe our enemy because the Bush Administration has ignored one of the most basic and obvious dictums of strategy—to know one's enemy, and without accurately understanding who and what they are fighting against they can't hope to fashion a successful response.

The second possibility is that this hearing is just another pre-election gambit to scare the public and bolt the support for the war in Iraq by engaging in enormous historic make-believe and proposing some parallel to World War III.

Actually, there is also a third possibility that both of these interpretations are correct.

I agree that there is a great struggle occurring within Islam and the outcome of that struggle will have a global impact on more than just Muslims. But it is equally clear that non-Muslims can only have a marginal effect on how that struggle evolves.

We can and should extol the universal values of peace, freedom, tolerance for all peoples. We can and should condemn acts of terrorism wherever and against whomever they occur. We can and should exhort Muslims to publicly and definitively reject these within their societies, and those in their societies who justify violence in the name of Islam.

But in the end it is for the global Islamic community to make these determinations and reject the extremists who have hijacked their faith in the name of a mad quest to return to the 13th century.

Unfortunately, at a point in history where the United States most needs the moral authority to influence the debate, the Administration has frittered it away. The Bush Administration has turned the near universal international support we had to invade Afghanistan in response to September 11th into universal opposition to United States leadership in foreign affairs and reflexive deafness to our message.

Iraq is central to our fight against terrorism, but not for the reasons suggested by the President. We didn't invade Iraq as a response to September 11th, and we didn't invade Iraq to fight al-Qaeda. My sad conclusion is the President pushed us to go to war in order to create a whipping boy, an example to shock and awe them in order to show others what fate awaited them if they resisted our righteous demands.

Obviously, not everything has gone according to plan since the President's "mission accomplished" moment aboard the Abraham Lincoln, and now we actually have to fight al-Qaeda terrorists in Iraq because of the catastrophic incompetence that has characterized the President's policy in Iraq that allowed the nation to slide into civil war and created precisely the unstable and chaotic conditions in which terrorists thrive.

It is not the model of American power and dominance that the President and his advisors so thoughtlessly expected. Far from it.

Instead, Iraq has become a quagmire, hindering all other efforts to fight terrorism outside of Iraq. The war in Iraq has diverted our attention. It has drained resources from the war in Afghanistan and allowed the resurgence of the Taliban, the midwives to the September 11 attacks. It has damaged our international alliances and obliterated our international image. It has cost a fortune in borrowed money, and has put tens of thousands of brave Americans into hospitals and rehabilitation facilities, and it has sent 2,984 American service members to their final rest.

The war against terror, against the fanatical deviants who attacked us on September 11th, will be a long one. It should involve all the assets and capabilities that the United States can bring to it. It will be fought militarily on a variety of battlefields but it will not be won there because the War on Terror is chiefly about ideas, democracy, freedom, tolerance, human rights, rule of law. We all know that is what the United States stands for.

People around the world used to believe that, but a policy that focuses solely on capturing and killing terrorists and their leaders while ignoring the battle of ideas will not defeat the enemy and in the end will not make us safer. The Administration should be devoting its efforts and attention to understanding and undermining our true enemies. To date, the Administration has not done that. This Congress should be compelling them to do so, and to date we have not done that.

We can win this battle and we must win this battle. Our ideas are clearly superior to the murderous, oppressive caliphate advocated by the enemy, but we are not winning the battle of ideas and we will not win if we do not know how to speak to those who might be receptive, or worse, can't even identify them.

I look forward to hearing from our very distinguished panel, and I thank you, Madam Chair, for holding the hearing.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Berman of California.

Mr. BERMAN. Madam Chairwoman, I have no opening statement. I wouldn't even try to compete with the breadth and passion of the two opening statements I have heard so far.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Wise man. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Wise guy. [Laughter.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I would like to introduce our distinguished panel. Tony Blankley is a Washington newspaper columnist and television commentator. Since he left his job as press secretary to former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich, he now is the editor of the editorial page of the *Washington Times*.

He has a substantial history in politics and journalism. A former deputy attorney general of California, Mr. Blankley came to Washington in 1980 to join the staff of President Ronald Reagan, serving as speechwriter, senior policy analyst and deputy director of planning and evaluation for 6 of the 8 years of the Reagan Administration.

Mr. Blankley has been a weekly columnist for the *Washington Times* for 3 years and was editor-at-large and columnist for *George* magazine and a syndicated columnist for the Creators Syndicate.

Thank you for joining us.

Next we will hear from Dr. Soner Cagaptay. Dr. Cagaptay is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Washington Institute's Turkish Research Program. He has written extensively on United States-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic policy, and Turkish nationalism, and has been published in many scholarly journals.

A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University on Turkish nationalism. He has taught courses at Yale and Princeton on the Middle East, Mediterranean and Eastern Europe topics. His spring 2003 course of modern Turkish history was the first offered by Yale in three decades.

Currently, he is an assistant professor in the Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University. He is currently researching the historical roots of Turkish secularism, the military as a safety valve for secular democracy, Turkey's recent experience with Islamic parties and government, and the political liberalization associated with Turkey's attempted EU accession.

We welcome you. Thank you.

After him we will hear from Mr. Steven Simon who is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Council, Dr. Simon specialized in Middle Eastern affairs at the RAND Corporation. He came to RAND from London where he was the deputy director for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and is a Senior Fellow in U.S. Security Studies. Thank you.

Before moving to Britain in 1999, Dr. Simon served at the White House for over 5 years on global issues and Senior Director for Trans-National Threats. During this period, he was involved in United States counterterrorism policy and operations as well as security policy in the Near East and South Asia.

And rounding up the panel we will hear from Hillel Fradkin. Dr. Fradkin is the Director for the Center of Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World at the Hudson Institute. Dr. Fradkin joined the Hudson Institute as a Senior Fellow in June 2004.

Prior to joining Hudson, he was president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center where he directed the Islam and American Democracy Program, the Jewish Studies Program and the Foreign Policy Program. From 1998 to 2001, Dr. Fradkin was a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute after a decade of service to the Lyn-

don Harry Bradley Foundation, serving as vice president. From 1983 to 1986, Dr. Fradkin was a program director with the John Olin Foundation.

We welcome all of the panelists. Your entire statements will be a part of the record, and we would appreciate it if you would limit your remarks to 5 minutes so we can have a round of questions.

I will have to go to a meeting with the Speaker and other folks on some of the issues of our legislative agenda. Mr. Pence has agreed to chair part of the hearing, and I hope to come back for the rest. Thank you.

Chairman Pence, and Mr. Blankley, we will start with you.

**STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BLANKLEY, EDITORIAL EDITOR,
"THE WASHINGTON TIMES"**

Mr. BLANKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Ackerman, and the panel. As was mentioned, I am largely a political creature and very far from scholarship, and if I have anything to contribute to the Committee, it is that, like congressmen and voters, we are generalists who are trying to extract some wisdom from the specialists and convert it into policy and politics, and I would like to address Mr. Ackerman's point because I agree with his central assertion that we don't understand after 5 years what the nature of the enemy is.

Now, we can decide who is to blame. It may be the uniqueness of the circumstance that it is not typical kind of a war that we are facing. Presidents always have responsibility, lead responsibility for leading the country, Congress has some. Those of us who are commenting have others.

It strikes me that the toxic nature of the fight that we are in in this country today, primarily on what we call the War on Terror, is to a substantial extent the product not of bad faith on either side, but on a failure to build a consensus both between Republicans and Democrats, and more generally in the public, as to the nature of the threat. And if you can't agree on the nature of the threat, then you can't agree rationally on what policies you are going to want to use to try to defeat that threat.

I have a quote in my book from Leonard Hand that he wrote during World War II on the bench, the greatest Justice never to make it to the Supreme Court, and he was talking about when you can intrude on civil liberties, and he made the point in ruling in favor, eventually, of infringing First Amendment rights in *Dennis v. United States*; that the test should be whether the gravity of the evil discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Thus, the greater the danger, the more likely it is to occur, the more intrusions are constitutionally justifiable.

There is a ferocious debate on surveillance, on all the issues that we are familiar with. Those of us largely on the President's side of this debate have been making the point that the danger is so great that this is allowed. We can't believe that people don't see the reason of it.

On the other side, those who don't see the threat perhaps in the magnitude that we do, say you are irrational to be doing these kind of intrusions in the absence of a need for it.

So that is why I hope there will be other discussions in Congress in the future on trying to understand the nature of the threat. It is late. It is 5 years in. Yet it is at the beginning of what is probably going to be an extraordinarily long process.

As I say, all I have done over the last 5 years is read the experts, talk with experts, and try to observe the scene as a politician and try to figure out what reality is, and I have been harsh on the President, for whom I wrote the endorsement editorial for the *Washington Times*, and I knew slightly when he was the vice president's son. I think this is so far beyond politics and friendship and partisanship that I think we have to try our best to just be objective about it.

Let me just mention Iraq briefly because it is the central focus today, and as I write in the book, if there is a tragedy regarding Iraq, whether one agreed with it at the beginning, still does, or never did, it has conflated—and the President's rhetoric is partially to blame, others are partially to blame—it has conflated Iraq with the essence of the War on Terror. In fact, it either is or isn't an element in the struggle.

Must as went to North Africa in 1942 at the beginning of World War II—I don't want to keep bringing up World War II, I know it is a metaphor that some people don't like on this—that wasn't the essence of World War II. The essence of World War II was going to be to go to Germany, but that was a tactic, an opening gambit. It may have been right. It may have been wrong. Iraq may have been right. It may have been wrong.

But the danger is that we have conflated Iraq with what is going to be over the next generation the essence of the war. I think the essence of our struggle is that we are experiencing a discontinuity in history. For the last 70–80 years, there has been a slowly building explosion of energy and ferment in Islam. You know, people point to the founding of Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 in Egypt. For a long time it had been festering amongst the intellectuals and small groups, and in the last generation some of these ideas have spread out dramatically into the grass roots.

The spreading out of these ideas is probably not disconnected from the rise of the Internet, and, particularly for Western Europe and perhaps for the United States Muslims living in these lands are getting more and more of their information and thoughts out of the Internet—just, by the way, as the printing press gave rise to the possibility of Protestantism. You needed to have a Bible if you weren't going to have a priest to explain it to you. It couldn't happen until you had a printing press and cheap Bibles.

The communication of ideas today through the Internet makes possible the rise of new versions of an old and admired religion.

So this is a great historical process that we are only at the beginning part of, and those who say, well, if we just bet bin Laden and al-Qaeda we will have largely solved the problem.

I think this is an explosion of energy similar to what we saw coming out of Europe in the 15th century, and while it affected the world dramatically, if you weren't European—you could ask the Indians, you could ask the coastal residents of Africa, you could ask most of what we now call the third world, it wasn't about America, it wasn't about Africa—it was about what was going on in Europe.

So at the same time that this explosion of energy is having an impact—it will have a big one on us, the West, India, other parts of the world—it is also about what is going on in Islam. I think it is noteworthy, for instance, when we talk about the Iran bomb possibility, that we remember that while most of us in the West called the Pakistani bomb the Muslim bomb, Iran calls it the Pakistani bomb, the Sunni bomb, and they want a Shiite bomb.

Now, therefore, when we engage that part of the radical Islamist threat, the possibility of an Iranian bomb, we have to understand we tend to be Western centric even as we engage the forces. We have to understand that we are not the only element of the reasons for the dynamic process that is going on in Islam.

I know my time is running out. Let me just very briefly conclude with one statistic—it is from the *Guardian Newspaper* from Britain in the fall of 2004—to give some suggestion that this is no longer simply small numbers of people who are being swept up in these radical ideas.

They polled the 1.5–2 million British Muslims, and the *Guardian*, by the way, as you know, was opposed to Blair, was opposed to Bush. So they weren't spinning numbers to help the Prime Minister or the President. And they found that a little bit more than 10 percent of their respondents in that poll were in favor of the idea of committing violent acts against the British Government. Another 30 percent were against that, but would refuse to cooperate with authorities if a co-religionist was being investigated for terrorism, and 60 percent, 60 percent of British Muslims would prefer to live under Shariah law, Muslim law, rather than under British law.

That gives one some sense. Now, there have been other polls since then that have produced results pretty much along the same lines. We are looking at a cultural phenomenon where elements of Islam are violently alienated from the West.

One last thought on the opening question of the clash of civilizations. I don't think we should get too hung up with the academic analysis of this point—the nature of Islam, the nature of the Koran. It is unknowable, of course. But for that segment of Muslims who are engaging us and are engaging the world, they are motivated by their sense, correct or incorrect, of their religion, of their culture and of their civilization, and the motive of that oppositional force is civilization, even if 80 percent of Islam is not so there, and we have to understand that that is the passion and motive and energy of the forces that we are opposing.

So I will leave it there. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blankley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BLANKLEY, EDITORIAL EDITOR, "THE WASHINGTON TIMES"

The nature and the origin of the threat posed by radical Islam is vastly more than al Qaeda and the stakes are much higher than most people realize. The danger is posed by the increasing rate of change and ferment amongst Islam's fifth of mankind—over a billion human souls.

One can take some measure of the rapidness of change in modern Islam by the fact that scholars are currently not able to even agree on the terms they use to describe the process. They continue to struggle over nomenclature. Terms such as fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalists, Islamists, jihadists, pietistic (or sheikist)

salafism, jihadist salafism, Wahhabist, Muslim Brotherhood, radical, extremist, militant, etc. are used in overlapping and contradictory ways.

For instance, Olivier Roy, a leading Parisian scholar of contemporary Islam limits the use of the term “Islamist” to Muslims who seek to apply Islam comprehensively to a state—as opposed to society in general. Whereas, many western analysts use the term Islamist as a synonym for armed jihadist or radical.

But across the range of experts—from American conservative analysts who are deeply fearful of Islam to the top European scholars who are much more sympathetic to Islam’s current potential for good—there is a broad area of agreement on the current state of Islam and the West.

Most experts agree that the current ferment originated in the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna—the first modern grassroots, urban mass movement of political Islam, designed to defeat western imperialism and secularism by turning back to a supposedly pristine form of Islam as practiced by the founder, Mohammed, and the early generations that followed him.

In time the Brotherhood gave rise to both moderate reform and violent jihad. The latter was championed by Sayyid Qutb in the 1940–60’s, whose book “Signposts on the Road,” became the seminal justification for jihad and terror as a necessary response to the predicament of Muslim conditions.

In Muslim lands of the middle east and central Asia, Islamic theories emerged to challenge the legitimacy of their local Muslim leaders—who were seen as captives of the West and opposed to bringing into being genuine Islamic rule. Islamists and jihadist became primary enemies for the Muslim governments, which executed their leaders, such as Sayyid Qutb (who was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966.)

Interlacing these developments, of course, has been the impact of wahhabism, which gained the conversion of the founder of the House of Saud in 1744. This austere, purist strain of Islam remained an inconsequential desert sect until the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia. Backed by billions of petro-dollars since the 1970’s, it has been spreading an aggressive anti-Western lesson throughout the Islamic world, and is one of the key tributaries that has helped form the current raging Islamic river which threatens to wash over the West.

One of the key shifts in modern radical Islamist thought has been the new centrality of individual jihad. Jihad had never been one of the five pillars of Islam—the five commitments that every Muslim must make to be a good Muslim: profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms—giving and pilgrimage.

But Sayyid Qutb and those who have developed his thoughts explicitly included jihad as a permanent and individual duty (fard’ayn). As Olivier Roy observes: “This is probably the best criterion with which to draw a line between conservative neofundamentalists and radical ones: the latter are rightly called jihadists. Among the few writings of Osama bin Laden, the definition of jihad as a permanent and personal duty holds a central place. His concept of suicide attack is not found in Islam.”

Thus these radicals who claim to be traditionalists have innovated the concept of individual jihad. And that therefore, such jihads are not from the Muslim community, but are individual decisions.

This is important because the recruitment of terrorists today tends to use appeals to individual responsibility for upholding Islam, and is ideally suited for the internet age where individuals not living in a Muslim land—perhaps sitting alone in their apartment in Hamburg or Rotterdam or Falls Church looking for meaning in their lives on the internet—make an individual decision to commit to suicidal jihad.

So long as there were few Muslims in the West and few connections between the lands of Islam and Western lands, the intricate theories of these reforming, fundamentalist, literalist, purifying strains of Islam were happily ignored by all in the West, except a handful of scholars.

The theoretical divisions between all these different groups reminds one of the similar plethora of factional groups in the emerging left wing of Western politics in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Who, other than the hand full of doctrinaire activists, cared to learn the distinctions between the socialist workers party, the communist labor party, the communist workers party, etc.

But in the last thirty years the Muslim population in Europe expanded rapidly from a few hundred thousand to over twenty million. And the coming of a globally connected world—and particularly the emergence of the internet in the last decade—has dumped all this furious passion, theorizing and action into Europe (and to a lesser but growing extent, into the United States).

It has done far more than merely transplant Islam’s internecine struggle to the West. Currently Muslims in Europe and the U.S. are not merely disputing amongst

themselves how Muslim nations should be run and how Muslims in the middle east and Asia should live their lives.

For the first time in modern history, Muslims are arguing over a three sided debate regarding whether their role in Europe is to: integrate into European society; ghettoize themselves, keeping separate from their European hosts; or convert Europe to Islam—the Islamization of Europe as called for in bin Laden’s declarations.

The last option has been seminally, perhaps prophetically, analyzed by Bat Ye’or in her recently published book “Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis.”

It is in the minds of the twenty million and growing Muslims living in Europe (and a much smaller, but growing number in the United States) that Danger is posed. Some large percentage of these people are content to be good, law abiding, culturally integrating citizens. But according to almost all estimates an increasing number feel some degree of alienation from the European culture. There are two reasons for this. Europeans tend not to greet immigrants as hospitably as Americans do—thus increasing the chance that the immigrant will resent European culture. But, importantly, because of the dynamic teaching and debate going on amongst Muslims in Europe, many Muslims are coming to believe that they have a religious duty not to integrate.

Amongst that group, some will be content to voluntarily secede from the local culture. Others will attempt to change European culture to Islamic form. And yet others will cross over into religiously justified (in their minds) violence.

Part of the analytical problem here is that both the peaceful and violent separatists derive their motivations from the same growing Salafist movement, both wings of which insist that there be no compromise with non-Islamic governments.

In trying to understand both the nature of the threat to us, and the range of options open to us to combat that threat, I need to pause here and note the emergence of the ambiguously motivated Islamic Party of Liberation (Hizh ut-Tahrir al Islamiyya.) It is, in the words of French scholar Olivier Roy, a former Islamist party that has turned neo-fundamentalist, while keeping some of its Muslim Brotherhood past, and insisting on building an Islamist state in the form of a caliphate that would rule over all the Muslim people (the ummah).

It is organized by cells in forty countries, is virulently anti-American and is both a conveyor belt and camouflage for terrorism—and yet it does not explicitly advocate terrorism. So what are Western governments to do with such an entity.

The best recent study of this movement was by Zeyno Baran for the Nixon Center in Washington D.C., for which she is the Director for International Security and Energy Programs. She also holds Stanford University’s Firestone Medal for her scholarship on Islam and Democracy.

Her study points out that the Islamic Party of Liberation shares the same political objectives as terrorists groups. It wants to replace the “judeo-Christian dominated nation-state system” with a borderless umma. Because it doesn’t call for violence, it is both more appealing to many Muslims and harder for a western governments to characterize as an outlawed organization.

“However,” as the Nixon Center study observes, “upon closer analysis it is clear that [its] renunciation of violence is only superficial. Violence has been repudiated by [them], but other groups working towards the same goals that do use violence are never condemned by [them]. The groups never denounce terrorists attacks. In many ways it is part of an elegant division of labor. The group itself is active in the ideological preparation of the Muslims, while other organizations handle the planning and execution of terrorist attacks.”

In other words, while al-Qaeda is the symbol and one of the implementers of terrorism, the Islamic Party of Liberation does the ground work of delivering the message and getting into the activist debate that ultimately leads to more recruits for terrorism

In this political communications struggle to win over the minds of European and American Muslims, as in most political communication efforts, the advocates try to manipulate and intimidate their target audience. So how do European Muslims get effected by this constant ideo-religious barrage?

The Canadian Muslim journalist and author, Irshad Manji at an Aspen Institute Berlin conference was remarkably frank in assessing both the nature and extent of Muslim extremism in Europe:

“It mostly depends on how you define extremism. If you mean “literalism,” then it is more than widespread—it is mainstream. If you mean the overt preaching of violence, then it percolates on the margins. The key is to recognize that because literalism is mainstream in Islam today, the thin minority of Muslims who have any intention of engaging in terror are nonetheless protected by the vast majority of moderate Muslims who don’t know how to debate and dissent with that proclivity.

“Let me explain why. We Muslims, even in the West, are routinely raised to believe that because the Koran comes after the Torah and the Bible (historically and chronologically), it is the final and therefore perfect manifesto of god’s will. The Koran, we are taught, does not lend itself to the inconsistencies and ambiguities and outright contradictions and, God forbid, human editing like those earlier scriptures. Mainstream Muslims believe, as an article of faith, that the Koran is not like any other scripture. It is the summit of the holy books. This is a supremacy complex, which even moderate Muslims share. And this supremacy complex is dangerous because when abuse happens under the banner of Islam, most Muslims do not yet know how to debate, dissent, revise or reform. That’s because we have not yet been introduced to the possibility, let alone the virtue, of asking questions about our holy book. The same cannot be said today for moderate Christians and Jews.

“In that sense . . . Islamic terrorism, both in the Netherlands and abroad, is able to thrive because it is embedded in a wider circle of fellow Muslims. This is the reality that most Western security experts have yet to grasp.

“ . . . [Because] most Muslims have never been given the permission to interpret the Koran freely, they feel it is not their place to denounce those who “know better.” Islamist terrorists are expert in quoting the Koran for their purposes. To question them, it is widely felt, is to question the Koran itself, and that is off limits.”

Mr. Manji went on to explain that: “A second reason is the sheer fear of persecution from fellow Muslims, even in open societies such as Western Europe and North America. Let me illustrate. Despite the anger, venom and death threats I receive for having written a book called “The Trouble with Islam” I’m much more surprised by the support, affection and even love I hear from fellow Muslims. But most of the Muslims who write to me in support, or who whisper “thank-you” in my ear after a public event, tell me that they can’t be public about the support. Nor do they feel that they can be vocal about their own struggles with the faith today. That’s because they fear “persecution.” I have engaged enough of the people who use this word to report that they mean more than ostracism. They mean physical reprisal against themselves and their families.”

The Muslim journalist and scholar, Manji, describes a process of the radical few intimidating into silence the non radical many. This is not a process unique to Muslim culture. A very similar process happened in Germany between 1919–1945.

Then, Germans felt humiliated, confused and swept-up in external forces and cultural intrusions. The Nazi’s, a tiny minority were both well organized, aggressive and claimed to speak for an ancient and true German culture. They particularly targeted German youth

As they alienated the youth from their parents, so they both intellectually and physically intimidated “good” Germans into silence, then collaboration and eventually full support.

It became both dangerous to one’s health and “unGerman” to oppose the Nazi movement. In essence in the 1920–30’s in Germany, the Nazi’s had both the “winning” ideas and the strongest fists. They seemed to have the wind of history at their back. Both by inspiration and intimidation they took over a nation adrift.

Muslims today, both those in traditionally Muslim lands and in Europe and the West are similarly situated. Radical Islam, accurately sometimes called Islamofascism, has all of those Nazi “advantages.” They find a Muslim adrift and humiliated by the dominance of foreign nations and cultures. They find a large youthful population who increasingly disdain their parents’ passive habits.

Just as the Nazis reached back to German mythology and their supposed Aryan racial origins, the radical Islamists are reaching back to the founding ideas and myths of their religious culture.

And, just like the Nazi’s, they are fabricating a mixture of authentic founding ideas with expedient new ideas masked as authentically ancient.

For instance, young Muslims are encouraged by the radical propagandist Mullahs to make individual decision to join jihad, and not to turn to parents for guidance on marriage mate selection. They are allowed to drink alcohol, shave their beards or take on other non-traditional Muslim life styles in order to advance the jihad.

In many ways these new radical fundamentalists are post-modern, not pre-modern. They are certainly designing a distinctly Western version of Islam, that is less and less connected to the Islam of their middle eastern homeland.

It is akin to genetically modifying an organism to make it a more effective intruder in a new host. Radical Western Islam brings with it the combative strength and deep faith of its authentic traditions, while constantly modifying itself in such ways as to maximize asymmetrical advantage over liberal, secular European (and American) institutions.

The jihad decision is a particularly critical radical innovation. Traditionally, only the doctors of Islamic law, the ulema, were authorized to declare armed jihad. It

was also the Ulema's job to distinguish between jihad and fitna. According to traditional doctrine the jihad is a force that restores harmonious order to the world, while fitna is the opposite—it is a seditious activity that threatens to fragment the faithful Muslim community.

Under the tradition, only the Ulema can legally declare jihad in its extreme form—as an armed struggle. They must first make sure it is not a false jihad or fitna.

By overturning the prerogative of the Ulema to make the final decision on armed jihad, and instead telling young Muslims that they may individually make the decision based on their own reading of the Koran, the radical neo-fundamentalists have vastly empowered themselves to organize and fight the West without the traditional collective restraints imposed by the Ulema.

In this way, they are similar to the Nazis of the 1920–30's, who successfully reduced or eliminated in the minds of German youth (and other vulnerable Germans, particularly the economically ravaged petty bourgeois), the authority of traditional German institutions such as the church, the government, parents and the professors. Instead, the Nazi's propagandized the youth to individually return to the allegedly ancient "truths" about their "Aryan race" and reject the guidance of their elders and the traditional institutions.

This Nazi mix of subverting traditional institutions and picking up useful modern methods, while urging a faux-return to ancient truths has been usefully called reactionary modernism. It is a vastly more potent and dangerous movement than mere nostalgia for the past or careful and dutiful adherence to the literal teachings of a culture or religion.

While fully exploiting young people's need to feel connected to something authentic and larger than themselves, it is free to expediently embrace such modern activities, customs or methods as their target audience of young Muslims might want to cling on to—or which might be useful in the struggle for dominance. The radical Islamists are able to rationalize concessions to modernity with ancient sounding mumbo jumbo, while still sounding like authentic fundamentalists, and the only true voice of Islam.

The Nazi's overwhelmed German society by these methods seventy years ago. And there is building evidence that the radical Islamists are moving ever more successfully down the same path—particularly within the younger generations of Western Muslims in Europe (and to a lesser extent in United States.)

Thomas Friedman, The New York Times foreign policy columnist, reporting from Paris in January of 2005 closed his column on the mood in Paris with the following anecdote about his interview of two French Muslim 18 year old girls who were born and raised in France.

"What did I learn from them? That they got all their news from Al Jazeera TV, because they did not believe French TV, that the person they admire most in the world is Osama bin Laden, because he was defending Islam, that suicide martyrdom was justified because there was no greater glory than dying in defense of Islam, that they saw themselves as Muslims first and French citizens last, and that all their friends felt pretty much the same."

As I discussed above, Muslims in Europe, and to a lesser extent in America,—particularly second and third generation Muslims—should not be considered part of a diaspora. Increasingly, they are no longer strongly connected to their family's country of origin. Nor do they intend to return. They are forming their own indigenous Muslim consciousness. Significantly, their connection to Islamic ideas come from the internet, books, video and audio tapes—all locations where radical ideas and mullahs dominate.

As the French Islamic scholar, Gilles Kepel describes it:

"On websites in every European language, whether jihadist or pietist, trendy jargon blends in with an intense polemic founded on obscure religious references to medieval scholars . . . In chat rooms, linguistic shortcuts mingle with a profusion of Islamic formulas. In the midst of an English text one finds PBUH (for Praise be upon him) in Arabic script. . . . All of this debate and intensity seems completely unrelated to the social and cultural reality of European Islam as it is lived in the worker's cities. Yet this strange language serves to express some of the tensions that pull members of these communities to one side and then the other."

The European internet has many radical Islamic "experts" and mullahs who function like Dear Abby. European Muslims pose questions—everything from whether to be polite to infidels, to how to prepare for jihad—and the "expert" provides an immediate answer, often a hodge podge of Koranic citations, quotes from ancient scholars and the expert's own advice.

It is in this constantly morphing digital environment that a new, increasingly radical Islam is emerging in Europe. Disconnected from their homelands, isolated from

their non-Muslim neighbors and fellow workers, disconnected from their elders—a weird, disembodied globalized radical Islam is appealing to Europe’s young Muslims. But not just to the Muslims.

Converts to Islam is a growing element. Olivier Roy identifies four categories of converts: politicized rebels, religious nomads, former drug addicts and petty thieves, and Blacks, Latinos and persons of mixed race.

The first category is catching European youth who a generation ago would have been swept up in Marxist movements. John Walker Lindh—the California Al Qaeda caught in Afghanistan—typifies the religious seeker. Drug addicts and thieves are seeking structure and support, while some young people of color find radical Islam a “rebukey” to a European or American society they feel has rejected them. Of course these converts are “an intense focus of terrorist networks” precisely because they do not “look” Muslim.

Prisons are obviously fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists. And, due to a combination of a false sense of tolerance and an almost inexplicable ignorance, prison authorities in both America and Europe are permitting radical, Wahhabist mullahs into the prisons—in much the same way as a Catholic priest or a Methodist minister might be invited in.

A generation ago, the American Black Muslim movement, whatever else might be said about it, went into the prisons and reclaimed young criminals to a life of good manners, gainful employment, respect for women, self-respect and usually lawfulness. Today the radical Muslim recruiters are enlisting an already battle hardened legion into the ranks of Islamic terrorists.

It is hard to quantify the current attitudes of Muslims in Europe because recent polling is spotty, but the Guardian Newspaper in Britain had done some reliable polling. In March of 2004, 13% of British Muslims favored more terrorist attacks on the United States. Another Guardian poll from November 2004 found that 86% of British Muslims were against the use of violence in Britain to gain political objectives. This was cited as good news by the liberal Guardian newspaper. But in fact it is appalling that over one in ten British Muslims (the 14% that didn’t oppose violence) would admit to a pollster that they were in favor of political terrorism in the country they called home.

In November of 2004, 61% of British Muslims wanted Sharia (Koranic-guided) law rather than British law applied to Muslims in Britain for civil matters—assuming it did not violate regular British law. And, in the same sample, one in four British Muslims (26%) believed that the Muslim community has already integrated too much into British society. That is up from 17% in a previous poll. Slightly more, 33% think more integrating should occur. But that number is down sharply from 41% in a previous poll.

Although those absolute numbers are fairly disturbing, the rapid movement in the numbers should be seen as even more alarming. A drop in support for becoming integrated into their society from over four in ten to barely three in ten (with almost all of that drop in support not stopping at undecided, but moving from 17% to 26% to the belief that they have already integrated too much) is an unambiguous indicator that the radical, culturally assertive argument is quickly winning the day in the already established British Muslim community. Attitudes of new immigrants is overwhelmingly likely to be even more hostile to Western culture.

While there are few good numbers available to objectively measure the magnitude of this aggressive cultural attitude, some numbers and events are suggestive of the growing danger.

In June 2004 Ken Macdonald, British Director of Public Prosecutions reported that he might re-open criminal investigations of 117 Muslim British Women who had been murdered because they were suspected to be victims in “honour killings,” in which Muslim men, under Muslim traditional laws are allowed to kill their wives, daughters and sisters if they believe they are “perceived to bring dishonor on their families.”

In January 2005 British Muslim cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed was reported by the London Times to have been monitored by that newspaper broadcasting on his internet site condoning suicide terrorist attacks and urging young British Muslims to join al-Qaeda. “I believe the whole of Britain has become Dar ul-Harb (land of war). In such a state the kuffar (non-believer) has no sanctity for their own life or property”, he said. He went on to advise one Muslim woman that she was permitted to become a suicide bomber.

After the broadcast, Mr. Bakri told the London Times that he was not calling for violent action in the U.K. He said his definition of Britain as Dar ul-Harb was “theoretical.”

A few days later he was monitored telling his listeners “Al-Qaeda and all its branches and organizations of the world, that is the victorious group and they have the emir and you are obliged to join. There is no need to mess about.”

Two nights later he broadcast that the voices of dead Mujahidin were calling young Britons to fight. “These people are calling you and shouting to you from far distant places: al jihad, al jihad. They say to you my dear Muslim brothers, “Where is your weapon, where is your weapon? Come on to the jihad.”

While the British authorities could detain him if he were deemed a terrorist associate under the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act, they had not yet done so after those broadcasts.

On a slightly different front, the British Advertising Standards Authority reported in January 2005 that British Muslims have stepped up a campaign of defacing or tearing down public billboards that feature ads that elements in the Muslim community consider inappropriate, such as ads for perfume, hair dye, undergarments and ads for television shows of which they disapprove.

In April 2004 Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV, one of three German intelligence services) issued a major report on Islamic extremism in Germany. While it could only identify 57,300 specific individual Muslims as “radical” (German bureaucrats are justly renowned for their careful attention to detail supported by impeccable record-keeping), Otto Schilly, the German Interior Minister stated that the extremist Islamist groups command a much larger number of covert sympathizers and had extended its influence to a wider swathe of the Muslim population than a year before. He added that they are reaching many more people with their “disintegrative activities” that were “in particular attracting a younger following.”

Minister Schilly expressed concern that the largest Islamic organization in Germany, Milli Gorus, while still technically a legal operation under German law has developed “a strong anti-western and anti-democratic character.” The organization specifically tries to indoctrinate Muslims living in Germany. “We’re very critical of their youth work”, said Schilly.

In November 2004 German television broadcast the words and images of a German Turkish Imam urging his Bavarian prayer room to “take advantage of democracy to further our cause

In Norway in December of 2004, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, expressed disappointment that “Most of Norway’s top politicians, but very few Imams participated in a torchlight protest march against violence and terrorism.” The March was to express outrage at the murder in nearby Holland the week before of film maker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim terrorist.

This boycott by leading Muslims in Norway came just days after the spokesman for the Islamic Council in Norway, Zahid Mukhtar, had said on national television that he could “understand that Muslims had been provoked by van Gogh’s latest film, and that he could understand why someone murdered him.”

Meanwhile, in Canada the debate about whether to establish Shariah law for Canadian Muslims is heating up. Shariah is the broad collection of laws compiled over a thousand years of Muslim jurisprudence based on the Koran and its commentaries, the Sunnah or Hadith. In 2004 Ontario Attorney General Marion Boyd suggested the possibility of applying Shariah under a 1991 Canadian arbitration law. Muslims in Canada have been engaged in a heated debate which Farzana Has-san-Shahid, the President of Muslims Against Terrorism, Canada, describes as “now being perceived as a battle between devout Muslims, and those who are Muslim in name only, whose sole objective . . . is to denigrate Islam and vilify Muslims.” This argument, that if you are not radical you are not a good Muslim, is of a piece with the Nazi argument in the 1920’s and 1930’s that if you are not a Nazi, you are not a good German and not a good child of the fatherland.

The radical Islamist’s assertion that Shariah should apply in Canada or Europe is another example of how they are manipulating Islamic traditions for the modern purpose of jihad and cultural aggression. Shariah was meant to apply in Muslim lands. Europe (and, obviously North America) were not such lands. Non-Islamic lands were designated either Dar al-Harb, the land of war, or Dar al-Sulh, the land of truce. The traditional, non-jihadists have historically designated Europe the land of truce—thus neither Shariah nor jihad would be legitimate.

But radical groups such as the European Fatwa Council—which is the legal arm of the British-based Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) has re-designated Europe as part of “the land of Islam.” Thus, they assert that Muslim’s are entitled to be judged by Shariah law, rather than the enacted law of which ever country they happen to be living in.

Whether in Britain, where 61% of British Muslims want to live under shariah, or Canada, where the fight is just now heating up, it is almost inevitable that the

side calling for a return to an alleged traditional, devout Islam are going to win these battles within the Muslim communities.

Once a Muslim in the West has accepted that first premise of returning to “devout” Islam, as opposed to “Islam in name only,” it becomes progressively harder to oppose the terrorist elements within their community. For example, in the same Guardian newspaper poll of November 2004 in Britain that found 86% opposed to the use of violence to gain their political ends, only about 70% told pollsters they would turn in a fellow Muslim if he was a terrorist.

So in Britain by the end of 2004, already about one in ten Muslims admit to be willing to commit terrorist acts, and one in three admit to be willing to protect Muslim terrorists from lawful authorities, while six in ten want to be governed by Muslim Shariah law rather than British law. And, virtually every law enforcement organization, intelligence expert and Islamic scholar believes the trend continues to move towards such attitudes and away from traditional, law abiding and assimilating intentions. Muslim parts of Paris, Rotterdam and other European cities are already called “no-go zones” for ethnic Europeans, including armed policemen. As the Muslim populations expand and their level of cultural/religious assertiveness expands, more and more European geography will be “reclaimed” for Islam. Europe will become pock-marked with increasing numbers of “little Fallujah’s” that will be impenetrable by anything short of military units.

Thus, as the partially ersatz westernized internet-communicated fundamentalism expands its reach in to European (and to a lesser, but probably increasing extent American) Muslim communities, not only will Islamic cultural aggression against a seemingly passive and apologetic indigenous population increase, but the zone of safety and support for the actual terrorist will expand.

For much of the West, but particularly for Europe, there is a blind denial that anything transforming in the world is really happening. For these people—which includes most of the European elites and far too many American politicians and journalists—it remains business and politics as usual. They are as sheep that cannot sense the wolf pack in the woods. Or if they see the odd wolf tail, they can’t imagine that the other end of the animal could at any moment be sinking its teeth into their throats. They have never been slaughtered before; surely they won’t be slaughtered now. So they go on munching.

Even for those who recognize the magnitude of the danger, there exists an inability to consider responses other than those that flow out of current practices and mentalities.

The central shortcomings of the West’s feeble response, to date, derive from the natural human instinct to forget the distant past and to assume that the more or less benign trends of the recent past will continue. In fact, human history unfolds much more by discontinuities from the past and dynamic social responses to the present. From the extraordinary explosion of Alexander the Great, to the birth of Christ, to the French Revolution to the American Civil War to the rise of Hitler, shocking discontinuities from the status quo have defined the path of history.

King Darius of Persia never imagined—even as he faced Alexander at the beginning of the Battle of Issus in 333 B.C., that within three years he would be dead, his Achaemenid Dynasty ended and the great hegemonic Persian Empire crushed and conquered as a result of that outnumbered Macedonian upstart.

American farmers in 1860 never dreamed that within months their husbands, sons and brothers would be killed in battle, and America would be transmogrified by continental war. And Londoners in the summer of 1939, my parents included, would have been disbelieving if they had been told that soon 40,000 of their fellow Londoners would lie dead in the streets from German bombing, and that within five years Great Britain would never be great again.

There is no more misleading phrase in the English language than “if current trends continue.” Stability is an illusion. Change is all. For both individuals and peoples, current trends never continue for very long. The better way to think is to ask when the current trends will stop, and what will follow them.

The first discontinuity that must be recognized, as I mentioned, is that the danger is not merely Osama bin Laden and a few thousand terrorists who may kill several thousand people and knock down some buildings. Although, Bin Laden and those he has inspired, alone, are a mortal threat. Rather, we are confronted with Islam in ferment and insurgent as it has not been in at least a half a millennium—if not a millennium and a half.

A great people, a proud culture, and a powerfully faith-inducing religion—a fifth of mankind—is unleashing an expansive energy at magnitudes that cannot yet be measured. Efforts to count the “jihadist” percentage is pointless, if not dangerously misleading. There is a dynamic process underway that may peter out before it

touches one in a hundred Muslims. Or, it may impassion a vastly greater number. The latter is the far more likely eventuality.

A force of Muslim energy is being released that has not been seen at least since the rise of the Ottoman Turks in the 15th century. In the following two hundred years that energy overwhelmed Bulgaria, Serbia, Andrianople, Kosovo, most of the rest of the Balkan Peninsular Constantinople, Budapest, Transylvania, Walachia, Moldavia, Persia, Egypt, Syria, and Greece. Only at the gates of Vienna in 1683, was the surge finally stopped—and then only barely.

Today we face a force of human passion and exertion that may well match a similar expansion that burst out of Renaissance Europe, and came to be known in the West as the Age of Discovery—but was known everywhere else as the age of conquest, imperialism and colonialism.

And let it be noted, the quality of the human stock that surged out of 15th century Europe was in no way superior to that which today peoples the Islamic world.

But one must be careful with historic analogies to avoid literalism. History is a guide to human potentialities, it is not necessarily a blueprint or predictor of particular strategies or tactics. The Ottoman Turks rode forth on horseback with curved swords in hand. The energy of Islam today insinuates itself through the forces of globalization and the internet.

It has long been observed by scholars that the Protestant Reformation would not have been possible without the invention of movable type by Guttenberg. The doctrinal requirement of a direct relation between the Protestant Christian and his bible without the intermediation of a church hierarchy was only possible when bibles were cheap enough to print that everyman, or at least every small village, could afford one.

The printing press made that possible. And the century-long wars of religion between Catholic and Protestant armies and peoples that ensued, killed five to eight million European Christians, including a third of all Germans.

Today, it is beginning to be noticed by astute observers, such as former senior CIA official Michael Scheuer, that the world-wide rise of Islamic ferment would not be possible without the internet. The internet uniquely creates virtual communities of interest. For actual Islamic terrorists, it constitutes a place to be trained in every aspect of the terrorist's art; and renders unnecessary physical training camps such as bin Laden set up in Afghanistan only a decade ago—and which we fought a war in 2001 to dismantle.

Similarly, for anyone, Muslim or otherwise, who wants to intellectually engage in the passionate debates that currently roil Islam, the debate, the passion, the propaganda, even the threats and intimidation are only a keyboard away. According to one count, the number of explicitly terrorist-supporting internet sites has risen from 12 to over two thousand in only a couple of years. The number of web sites more generally engaged in Islamic ferment are too numerous to yet be counted.

Beyond that unknown, but obviously growing, number of Muslims around the world, who are committed to terrorism, perhaps as great a threat as terrorism arises from the Islamic diaspora's growing cultural and religious assertiveness. This is particularly the case in largely secular Europe, where Muslim cultural assimilation must be considered a failure even before September 11th.

Curiously, despite (or perhaps because of) America's deeper and more pervasive religious faith and practice, American Muslims have better assimilated into our culture. As a nation of immigrants, our culture has always welcomed other peoples more instinctively than have the more ethnically homogenous European nations. But even in America, the danger of Muslim cultural assertiveness, and in some unknown number, support for Islamist terrorists, is a potential danger that must be monitored and contained. At this point it is not knowable whether the still gathering worldwide Islamic ferment and insurgency may come to grip and taint our current and growing Muslim population.

And, what takes this danger beyond prior historical precedent is the high likelihood that biological, chemical, radiological or (less likely, but possibly) even nuclear weapons of mass destruction will come into the hands of radical Muslims, raising the quite plausible specter of genocidal warfare anytime in the next few years or decades.

A big part of the problem in understanding the threat comes from not having any obvious words to describe it. As linguists explain, an important role of language is its capacity to evoke cognitive images which mold our notion of reality. The right word or phrase creates an understanding and opens in our minds concepts of things we can't see.

For example without the word "love," sentences, paragraphs, sonnets, whole volumes would be needed to create and communicate the idea. While there are different kinds of love, yet the use of that one word effectively conveys a whole set

of sentiments and relationships which most people immediately understand. The word is not a description, but an evocation of an idea.

And the wrong words create the wrong mental concepts. From the beginning, the phrase War on Terror has been a deeply flawed description of both the danger and our response. As I discussed, above, the danger is more than terrorist attacks. It includes, along with actual terror strikes, immigration, cultural aggression, a conflict of values, religions and life styles. Professor Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" is a closer approximation of the danger.

But even the word "clash" evokes the linear image of a line of confrontation. And indeed, Professor Huntington, writing in 1994, described a geographic arc of danger from the middle east to Indonesia. In fact, in today's globalized and internetted world, the forces we must confront are ubiquitous. They are ahead of us, behind us and within us.

So also is the word 'war' inadequate to evoke in our minds the kind of conduct in which we are involved. WW II is what we think of as a war: millions of uniformed soldiers, thousands of ships, tanks and airplanes engaged in the activity of materially destroying the enemy's martial assets, seizing geographic locations and eventually marching into the enemy's capital and hanging or imprisoning their leaders.

But the word war is right, if inadequate, in one crucial mental element. It correctly evokes the sense of physical danger and the need for extraordinary action and possible sacrifice. It is also partially correct, in that in the course of this struggle, there will be conventional military battles. Afghanistan and Iraq were wars as conventionally understood. There will surely be several others.

Another problem with the word war is its recent metaphoric usage: Over the last quarter century Americans have been called to wars against cancer, drugs, obesity and poverty, among other bad things we have in our lives. Thus, the war on terror seems to fall somewhere between a clichéd metaphor and a literal phrase that doesn't seem to meet the literal definition of the term. The term not only fails to describe or accurately evoke the nature of the activity we are engaged in, but it induces cynicism.

Perhaps no aspect of our response has been thrown into more disarray over this terminological confusion than our legal system. As a nation of constitutional law and precedent, the legal status of an activity is vital to determining its constitutionality.

During the various states of war over the last two hundred years, our Supreme Court has upheld government intrusions on civil liberties, including enforcement of laws of sedition, censorship, and internment of both enemy aliens and, in the case of the Japanese, American citizens. But whether such intrusions have been constitutionally permitted has depended on the actual circumstances and—importantly—whether or not Congress has authorized a state of war.

As Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote in 1998: "When the President acts pursuant to an expressed or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate . . . If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power."

Currently, while we are engaged in a "War on Terror," the President has not sought a full state of war status. He has merely gained authorization to fight limited actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

But, of course, if he sought a declaration of war, against whom would it be declared? On December 8, 1941 Franklin Roosevelt declared war on "The Japanese Empire." On April 2, 1917, Woodrow Wilson declared war on the "Imperial German Government." Against whom would President Bush and Congress declare war in the War on Terror?

Certainly there are several countries which harbor and give succor to terrorists. Conceivably, each of those countries could be the subject of war declarations. But often the terrorist support in those countries come from rogue elements. And even if they are, as governments, guilty of war terror making against the United States, such countries do not include all the terror warriors who are or may become aligned against us.

Many, if not most of those combatants making or planning war terror against us are in fact private citizens in countries like Britain, France, Germany and Holland, which governments would catch and stop them if they could. In the parlance of military strategists, the enemy are "non-state actors."

Thus, because there is no government against which to declare comprehensive war, the maximum authority of the federal government to prosecute the war cannot be invoked. And yet we are at maximum peril.

The traditional constitutional war powers are fairly massive and very intrusive. President Bush has not requested such authority and thus he has not yet exercised them.

But why has President Bush not sought full constitutional war-fighting authority from Congress?

After all, even the President's most virulent opponents would concede the man is bold and assertive. And those who know the President best are convinced that he is fully seized of the existential threat that America currently faces from insurgent Islamists. Good heavens, the man has been prepared to upset the entire international order, flout the United Nations, outrage our closest European allies, destabilize friendly middle east governments, fight two wars and risk his presidency—so determined is he to try to protect our country.

And yet he has not sought nor exercised full war powers. I would suggest that even George the Bold has hesitated because he correctly judges that a majority of the public, the politicians and the media do not believe we are actually in a war. And that in the absence of a word, a phrase or a concept that convincingly describes this dangerous-as-war-but-different condition, the public can only assume that we are in a state of less than war.

In fact, I believe we are in a condition more than war—at least as America has understood a war threat since our founding.

This strange war-but-not-war condition that we find ourselves in was shrewdly described by William S. Lind, former Democratic Senator Gary Hart's military advisor, and four Army and Marine Corp officers in a recent Marine Corp Gazette article describing what they call 4th generation warfare between a nation-state and non state actors:

"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depths, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical entity."

In an odd way, we face a similarly vexing and confusing situation to that which the American Indians faced when confronted with European explorers in the 15th, 16th and early 17th centuries.

The Europeans were not exactly an army, and warfare did not exactly breakout. Indeed, often both sides seemed almost friendly and cooperative. Had the Europeans been seen as a threat, the Indians could have slaughtered them in short order. Even with their guns, there were only a few hundred Europeans, while there were hundreds of thousands of Indians.

Only gradually did the part colony, part exploration, part trading quest, part military intrusion gain in magnitude, change in intent, establish beachheads and eventually overwhelm the native population. The Indians lost despite their vast material and numerical advantage and their superior knowledge of the geography of what turned out to be a battlefield—because they had no point of reference in their history to properly judge what they were seeing before their very eyes.

The challenge for American and the West today is to be mentally alive to the fact that what we are experiencing with the Islamist insurgency is something different from anything we have experienced before. For Europeans, it is something different even than the earlier Muslim expansions.

Because it is something new for us, our laws, traditions, ethical codes, concepts of friend and foe have not evolved to recognize and manage such a threat. As the greatest American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "The Life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience."

As our law and cultural institutions have not experienced this new phenomenon of a great cultural insurgency in a globalized, internetted, biological, chemical and nuclear weapon-present world, we must consider with a cool logic to what extent our self-imposed historic standards of conduct are sufficient to protect us from this new danger.

* Abstracted, abridged and modified from my book, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?*

Mr. PENCE [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Blankley, and I thank the panel.

I will make an exception to my ordinary practice and be fairly liberal with the clock. I appreciate your sensitivity to our being caught without lights.

So with that, I would add as acting Chair my welcome to this panel on this provocative question, and recognize Dr. Cagaptay for 5 minutes with gratitude.

STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am submitting my full testimony for the record and will summarize my statements in specifically discussing the question of a clash of civilization. What I would like to do today is look at the case of Turkey and discuss the case of Turkey's recent drift away from the West and in discussing this issue I will have to split between Muslim countries and the West.

I spent a month of my summer in Turkey recently and came back with amazing and somehow shocking observations and those are some of the observations I would like to share with you.

I think in the post-September 11th world one of the things that came about Turkey is that, as a secular country with democracy rooted in Western institution, Turkey emerged as the pivotal country in debunking the argument that there exists a class of civilizations, and for a long time the country does receive a lot of credit for that.

Yet my observations from my trip lead me to believe that there is a seismic change going through Turkey right now, and in a sense the country's unique position as a country that is anchored in the Western world is being challenged, and it seems to me that the rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, also known as the AKP party government in Turkey in November 2002, is a milestone in this process.

What I would like to do today is highlight some of the changes that have taken place in Turkey since 2002, since the AKP came to power.

Until November 2002, Turkish foreign policy was quite predictable. Ankara cooperated with Washington on many issues, from the Balkans to the Middle East. It aligned itself with Israel and kept arms-length from its Middle East neighbors, such as Syria and Iran, which composed various stresses to Turkey, whether in terms of regime export from Iran or support for PKK terrorism from Syria. On the European front, Turkey pursued an aggressive policy of EU accession. This was the picture back in 2002.

Today, though, it looks quite different. United States-Turkish relations are strained almost on all Middle East issues. From the views on terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to dealing with Iran and Syria, United States and Turkey have developed vastly divergent positions since AKP's rise to power.

The question is, how did we get here? What happened in the 4 years since the AKP came to power? I think we started with the Iraq War. Right after the Iraq War, in March 2003, the AKP controlled parliament in Ankara refused to allow the creation of a Northern Front. We all know that.

After that, though, what happened was the AKP took issue with the war and sharply criticized United States policies in Iraq, and

then went on to castigate other United States policies in the Middle East. This anti-American rhetoric, I think, has caused a shift in Turkish public opinion toward the United States and while the AKP at the same time pursued rapprochement with Muslim states in the Middle East, and, accordingly, I think Turkish and American views of the region now diverge significantly.

Let me give you some examples. While, for example, the United States has aimed to isolate Syria internationally, AKP has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Damascus. Relations between Ankara and Syria improved noticeably since 2002 with the help of high-level visits. Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul have visited Damascus numerous times. In return, the Syrian Foreign Minister and Syrian Prime Minister have appeared in Ankara, and I think the most important visit encapsulating the rapprochement was the visit of Syrian President Bashar al Assad to Turkey in January 2004.

Whereas only a few years ago, Syria would have been regarded as an enemy country because of its support for PKK terrorism, the AKP Government received Assad with praise in Ankara. Before leaving Ankara, Assad summarized the gist of the Turkish-Syrian relations and a successful trip to Turkish network CNN-Turk, and he said, "We have moved together from an atmosphere of distrust to trust."

It is not only Turkey's relations with Syria but also Turkey's ties with Iran that are improving noticeably since the rise of the AKP. Again, many high-level visits, in 2003, the year after the AKP came to power, for example, on the ministerial or prime ministerial level, from Turkey to Iran, from Iran to Turkey, including one by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who has since then also paid other visits to Ankara.

Since 2003, Iran has been claiming to be cracking down on PKK terrorism within its borders, which is Ankara's most pressing concern vis-a-vis the country. Lately, there have been some signs that Turkey—the AKP Government—may be supporting the European initiative to block Iran's nuclearization, but even then, given the nature of enhanced ties between Ankara and Tehran, it is very hard to believe that, for example, the AKP Government would ever, for instance, join international sanctions against Tehran if they were to be implemented, let alone take part in any kind of aggressive action to challenge Iran's nuclearization.

So on the one hand, while the AKP has pursued its policy of rapprochement with Iran and Syria, Turkish attitudes toward the United States have soured significantly, and I think this has got to do with 4 years of extremely harsh criticism of American foreign policy in the Middle East by the AKP Government.

The military incursions into Fallujah, for example, were called "genocide" by AKP deputies in the parliament using official parlance, and I think this attitude has created what could be a permanent dent in Turkish public opinion, whereas in the pre-AKP period, before 2002, more than half of Turks typically expressed favorable views of the United States. Today, according to a June Pew Center report, only 12 percent view American positively. In that study, what is interesting is that the United States is favored less in Turkey than in Egypt or Jordan. Now, that is definitely an ac-

complishment, though a negative one, I think, as far as AKP's performance is concerned.

Now, clearly some of the blame, I think, in this issue lies here in Washington. Americans' unwillingness to take action against the PKK presence in northern Iraq from where the group is attacking Turkey is a source of frustration in Turkey, and I saw that during the summer.

Turkish casualties resulting from PKK terrorist attacks have been mounting lately at a rate close to that experienced by United States forces in Iraq. In fact, yesterday there was a bomb in a Turkish town killing 10 people, all children, planted by the PKK. So this is aggravating public opinion toward the U.S. and it is a tool with which the AKP is facilitating that process.

Another tool with which the AKP is facilitating the process is that the civilian carnage in Iran, footage of that on Turkish networks, has added to the frustration inside the country. Yet there is something peculiar about anti-Americanism in Turkey under the AKP.

As I said earlier, whereas in the pre-AKP period a majority of the Turks viewed America positively and the Turks were America's best friends in the Muslim world for decades, today they seem to have the least favorable opinion of the U.S. anywhere in the Muslim world.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the AKP's alternative is the Muslim Middle East. The party has demonstrated what I would call an intensive and almost bizarre interest in all Muslim causes. For example, at the onset of the Israeli/Hezbollah war in July Prime Minister Erdogan criticized Israel for trying to wipe out the Palestinians in Lebanon, bringing together the Palestinian question and the Hezbollah question in a very murky way.

On the same day he made this argument, a PKK terror attack killed five Turkish soldiers. Erdogan not only failed to mention the attack, but also totally omitted the parallels between Hezbollah violating Israel's borders and PKK violating Turkey's borders and how these are actually two terror groups on internationally-recognized borders. Its foreign policy gives me the impression that Muslim causes are more important than Turkish ones.

The change of tone on Turkey's Middle East policy has not been without consequences. The Turkish media have run very lengthy anti-Semitic articles. It is a shocking development in a country that has always prided itself on helping Jews and saving Jews, from those who fled from the Spanish Inquisition to those who fled the Nazis. A recent anti-Israeli demonstration which took place while I was in Turkey attracted 100,000 people in Istanbul, again a shocking development given that in the pre-AKP period such demonstrations would have attracted a few hundred die-hard jihadists.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the AKP challenges Turkey's Western orientation not only through its foreign policy initiatives, but also through its words, the way it spins public opinion, the way it shapes public opinion. The party leadership, for example, almost always describes Middle East issues as religious conflicts, bringing in the clash of civilizations, and shaping Turkish public opinion on such issues through the prism of the clash of civilizations.

For instance, AKP leader Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has more than once characterized the Israeli-Hezbollah war as a religious conflict, stating that “mothers and sons are being martyred in Lebanon.” For me, such rhetoric suits more the year 1099 and the crusades than Turkey, which is negotiating for entry into EU.

Another incident in 2005——

Mr. PENCE. If the witness could summarize, we are a few minutes late.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I will. At the Arab League summit in Sudan’s capital, he said, “The West uses terrorism to sell us weapons,” and this is an Arab League summit, so I think in his mind this shows where he thinks Turkey belongs—not in the West but, ironically, in the Arab world.

So why is the party pursuing such policies? I think if Islamist ideology is one part of it, the other part of it is that there are some domestic aspirations. The AKP’s conundrum is that it is not supported by a majority of Turks, and the party has used populous foreign policy that bashes the West to boost its domestic standing.

In a way, the party is not only spoiling Turkish attitudes toward the United States, but also drawing from this attitude in terms of support for its domestic policy. If Turks think of themselves as Muslims first in the foreign policy arena, which is what they are doing now, then inevitably one day they will think of themselves as Muslims first in the domestic arena, providing more support for the AKP.

In finishing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight that some realists will suggest that Turkey’s ongoing drift away from the West is an internal matter, and what is more important is to promote a short-term AKP commitment to Washington’s policy objectives in the region, such as encountering Iran’s nuclearization. This does not seem viable. Here is why.

In the recent discussion on sending Turkish peacekeepers to Lebanon, there was fierce debate in the parliament and the Prime Minister encountered these rejections or these objections to sending peacekeepers to Lebanon, saying that Turkey would neither disarm or harm Hezbollah, and then the idea of peacekeepers was approved.

If Turkey, AKP’s Turkey needs to be convinced to take part in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon only on the condition that Hezbollah will not be confronted, how will the same government ever join any action against Iran?

I can continue, but I think I would like to finish by highlighting that the AKP experience in Turkey shows that once in government, Islamist parties bring forth change in unexpected ways, even in the most secular and democratic of those societies. The AKP’s foreign policy is scratching away the Turks’ sense of Turkishness or national identity, infusing instead a strong sense of Muslim identity.

In the rift between the West and the Muslim world, I think Turkey is fast approaching the tipping point at which the cat will not walk back. Whether this transformation continues will depend on whether the United States takes the right steps to disarm the chief facilitator of anti-Americanism in Turkey, PKK terror. As a good step, lately we have seen the appointment of a special envoy to discuss the issue of combatting PKK terror.

A second factor that will determine Turkey's future are the elections in the country in 2002. Will secular, Western-minded Turks—long unable to provide a captivating political message—successfully challenge the AKP and will the U.S. back up such a message? If not, I am afraid that a second AKP Government might well turn Turkey into an unrecognizable country—somehow democratic, superficially secular, and definitely not Western.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]

**Statement
Of
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.**

Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

**Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East
and Central Asia**

**of the
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives**

**Hearing on
"Is there a Clash of Civilizations? Islam, Democracy, and U.S.-Middle East
Policy."**

September 14, 2005

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am submitting my full testimony for the record and will summarize my statement. In discussing the question of a clash of civilizations between the West and Muslim countries, I would like to elaborate on Turkey, and its Western orientation, specifically the issue of Turkey's recent drift away from the West.

In the post September 11 world, as a secular democracy deeply entrenched in Western institutions, Turkey emerged as a pivotal country in debunking the argument of a clash of civilizations. Yet, my recent observations lead me to believe that Turkey's unique position as a country anchored in the Western world is being challenged. In this regard, the **rise of the Islamist Justice and Development (AKP) party government in November 2002 presents a milestone in driving this process.** Hence, I would like to focus my discussion today on the gap that has emerged between Turkey and the West since the AKP's rise to power in 2002.

Turkey's Foreign Policy Orientation before the AKP

Until November 2002, Turkish foreign policy was quite predictable. Ankara cooperated enthusiastically with Washington, whether in the Middle East or in the Balkans. Turkey aligned itself with Israel and kept at arms length from Middle Eastern neighbors such as Syria and Iran. On the European front, Ankara

Turkey's Foreign Policy Orientation since the AKP's Rise

Today, though, the picture looks much different. U.S.-Turkish relations are strained on almost all Middle East issues. From their views of terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to dealing with Iran and Syria, the US and Turkey have developed vastly disparate views since AKP's rise to power

How did we get here? In the run up to the Iraq War in March 2003, Turkey's AKP government refused to allow the creation of a northern front. After that, the AKP took issue with the Iraq War, and sharply criticized U.S. policies in Iraq. Later on, the AKP castigated other U.S. policies in the Middle East. The AKP has not only used anti-American rhetoric, causing a shift in Turkish public opinion towards the U.S., but has also pursued rapprochement with Muslim states in the Middle East. Accordingly, Turkish and American views of the Middle East have diverged significantly.

For instance, while the U.S. has aimed to isolate Syria internationally, Turkey has pursued a policy of rapprochement with Damascus. Relations between Ankara and Damascus have improved noticeably since 2002 with the help of high-level visits. Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan have visited Damascus numerous times. In return, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara and Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro have visited Ankara. The most important visit encapsulating the rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus was Syrian President Bashar al Asad's January 2004 trip to Turkey. Whereas only a few years ago, Turkey viewed Syria as an enemy country due to Damascus' support for terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Asad was showered with praise by the AKP government. Before leaving Ankara, Asad summarized his successful trip to Turkish network CNN-Turk: "We have moved together from an atmosphere of distrust to trust."

Relations between Turkey and Iran have also improved noticeably since the AKP's rise. During 2003, for instance, four high-level visits took place from Turkey to Iran (two by Turkish Foreign Minister Gul), and six from Iran to Turkey, including one by Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi. Since 2003, Iran has claimed to be cracking down on PKK terrorists within its borders, Ankara's most pressing concern. Advances were also seen in the cultural sphere. A December 2003 treaty on educational cooperation between Turkey and Iran creates mechanisms for Turkish students to study in Iran, provides for reciprocal scholarships and facilitates the sharing of curricula between the two countries, (a difficult endeavor, given that Turkey has a secular education system whereas Iran does not). Although lately, there have been signs that Turkey supports the European initiative to block Iran's nuclearization, enhanced ties between Ankara and Tehran make it very hard to believe that the AKP government would ever, for instance, join international sanctions against Tehran, let alone take part in aggressive action to challenge Iran's nuclearization.

criticism of American foreign policy in the Middle East -- U.S. military incursions into Fallujah in 2004, for example, were officially called a "genocide" in Turkey -- have created what could be a permanent dent in public opinion. Whereas in the pre-AKP period typically more than half of Turks expressed favorable views of the U.S., a June Pew Center survey showed that only 12% of Turks view America positively. In that study, the U.S. is favored worse in Turkey than in Egypt or Jordan.

Some of the blame lies with Washington. America's unwillingness to take action against terrorist PKK in northern Iraq is a source of frustration. Lately, Turkish casualties resulting from PKK attacks have been mounting at a rate close to that experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq. The civilian carnage in Iraq itself has added to the Turkish frustration.

Yet, there is something peculiar about anti-Americanism in Turkey under the AKP. Whereas in the pre-AKP period, the Turks were America's best friends in the Muslim world, today they have the least favorable opinions of the U.S.

The AKP is also alienating Turkey's other traditional ally in the region, Israel. A good example came earlier this year when Erdogan invited the leader of Hamas's military wing, Khaled Mashaal to Ankara, despite criticism from the West and pro-Western Turks. The AKP continues to defend the visit, keeps contacts with Mashaal, and opposes Western efforts to isolate Hamas.

Mr. Chairman, the AKP's alternative is the Muslim Middle East. The party has demonstrated an intense and bizarre interest in all **"Muslim causes."** Last month, at the onset of the Israeli-Hezbollah war, Erdogan lambasted Israel for trying to "wipe out the Palestinians" in Lebanon. On the same day, a PKK terror attack killed five Turkish soldiers. But Erdogan failed to mention the PKK in his speech. Erdogan's foreign policy gives the impression that Muslim causes are more important than Turkish ones.

The AKP's change of tone on the Mideast isn't without consequences. The Turkish media have run virulently anti-Semitic articles -- a dreadful development in a country that has prided itself on saving Jews who fled the Spanish Inquisition as well as the Nazis. A recent anti-Israel demonstration in Istanbul attracted around 100,000 people. Before the AKP, anti-Israeli protests would have drawn just a few hundred die-hard jihadists.

Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, the AKP challenges Turkey's Western orientation not only through its foreign policy initiatives, but also through its words. **The AKP leadership almost always describes regional issues in the Middle East as religious and cultural conflicts, shaping Turkish public attitudes on such issues through the prism of a clash of civilizations.**

words. **The AKP leadership almost always describes regional issues in the Middle East as religious and cultural conflicts, shaping Turkish public attitudes on such issues through the prism of a clash of civilizations.**

For instance, AKP leader Erdogan has more than once characterized the Israeli-Hezbollah war as a religious conflict, stating, for instance, that "mothers and sons are being martyred in Lebanon." Such rhetoric suits more the year 1099 and the crusades, than Turkey which is negotiating entry into Europe in 2006.

In another incident, in 2005, Erdogan spoke at the Arab League summit in Sudan's capital, Khartoum, saying "The West uses terrorism to sell us weapons." Such remarks show where Erdogan thinks Turkey belongs- not in the West but strangely enough, in the Arab world. (The Arab countries showed a better sense of national identity vis-à-vis Erdogan: they turned down Turkey's application to join the Arab League, saying Turkey is not an Arab country).

Why does the AKP pursue such policies? If Islamist ideology constitutes one part of the AKP's foreign-policy calculus, domestic aspirations are another. The AKP's conundrum is that it is not supported by a majority of Turks, and has therefore **used a populist foreign policy that bashes the West to boost its domestic standing.**

This is working: Not only are Turkish attitudes toward the U.S. spoiling, but the AKP now draws broad domestic support from its foreign policy. If Turks think of themselves as Muslims first in the foreign-policy arena, then one day they'll think of themselves as Muslims first in the domestic one. A telltale sign of the growth of Islamist sentiments is the surge in Islamist media. In the last four years, Islamist newspapers have boomed in Turkey. Combined circulation figures for the Islamist press in Turkey have almost tripled to more than 1.1 million today from 441,200 in 2001. Another alarming sign is changing Turkish attitudes towards the Christian faith. According to the June Pew Center report, today only 15 percent of the Turks have favorable opinions of Christians.

Mr. Chairman, some policy realists may suggest that Turkey's ongoing drift away from the West is an internal matter and that it is more important to promote a short-term AKP commitment to Washington's policy objectives in the region, such as encountering Iran's nuclearization. This does not seem viable. Here is an example showing why.

Following a recent fierce debate that led up to a parliamentary vote, Turkey approved a motion to send peacekeepers to Lebanon. In demonstrating how far Turkey has drifted away from the West and towards the Muslim world, Erdogan countered public objections to sending peacekeepers to Lebanon, saying that "Turkey would neither disarm nor hurt Hezbollah." With that promise, the Turkish parliament approved sending peacekeepers to Lebanon. **If AKP's Turkey**

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Dr. Cagaptay. And Dr. Simon is recognized with the Council on Foreign Relations, and very welcome. We are grateful that you are here.

STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN SIMON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee. My observations are personal. They don't reflect the views of the Council on Foreign Relations which, in any case, doesn't have a corporate position on these matters.

I would just like to say in a preambular fashion, probably unnecessary, that it is quite awkward to generalize about things relating to Islam. It makes more sense—especially given the fact that there are 1.4 billion Muslims, give or take, on the face of the planet on just about every continent and who differ by nationality, sect, temperament, profession, class, gender—that generalizations are suspect or ought to be suspect.

So when we talk about Islam, we should be talking about the way in which Muslims interpret their faith and how they live it. It is very difficult to generalize about Islam per se.

Having said that, I would like to concentrate on seven conditions that I think are relevant to the Committee's concerns today as I understood my instructions, and these are seven things that give the jihad legs, that make it a robust and durable phenomenon.

The first is the deep roots of the revival movement in which the jihad is embedded. The second is the connection between contemporary salafism or what we might call a hard Islam or fundamentalist Islam and jihadism. The third relates to the changing nature of clerical authority within the Islamic world. The fourth factor is the globalization of Muslim identity. The fifth is the evolution of anti-Americanism among Muslims. The sixth are the linkages between jihadism and persisting patterns of social organization, particularly in the Arab world. That sound very social sciencey; it is much simpler than that. And finally, the continuing debate over killing civilians within Islamic jurisprudence; that is, killing civilians in the defense of Muslim interests.

Now, the reason I go through this laundry list—and one could add to it, of course—is simply to say that the jihad is the result, is surviving, on the basis of a host of interlocking factors that are mutually reinforcing, and that even if the U.S. were to knock down one or another or three of these contributing factors, it would still be complex and durable.

On origins, you know, all I will say is that they are deep. They go back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is part of a revival movement that came about during the colonial period when Muslim thinkers thought, well, you know, what is going on here, we are subordinated. We are poor. We don't control our destinies. How do we retain our destinies? Well, return to scripture. Recover this kind of vitality that lies in sacred scripture and in the experience and lessons of the first generations of Muslims.

Now, in the course of a century, it was transmuted by increasingly bitter experiences into something with a much harder edge.

It is also conflated with this thing that I referred to as salafism. The early companions, the first three generations of Mohammed are the generations to which these Muslim revivalists look back. They are the most authentic, and they are referred to as the ancestors, the salaf, and those who take this point of view very seriously are called salafists.

Now, most of them are pietistic. They focus on the reform of society. Teaching and preaching are their tools. There are politically-engaged salafists that do mix it up, but not violently. You can think of them as lobbyists in a way, but there is a hard edge to salafism and those are the jihadists, and they are informed or shaped by a particular element of salafism which emphasizes sectarian differences and emphasizes the battle that ought to be taking place or certainly the separation that should be made between Muslims and other religions, particularly Christians and Jews and Shiia for that matter.

So this is a deeply-rooted phenomenon and salafism at this point seems to be burgeoning and it is burgeoning because it is a relatively uncomplicated doctrine. It draws clear distinctions between right and wrong, and us and them. It promises a secure personal identity, a stable role in a community, and it disregards local customary variations of Islamic practice which have divided Muslims. So it tends to bring Muslims together, give them more of an essential shared identity, so deep roots.

Clerical authority, well, this is a theme that has been treated many times. I won't go into a lot of detail about it except to say that there seems to be a breakdown of clerical authority which has contributed to this easy slide from salafism to jihadism, and as a result of this breakdown of clerical authority there is no universally credible or authoritative institutional break on the current tendency to justify violence in religious terms, particularly against civilians.

Globalized identity is something I mentioned as important. You know, in the 18th and 19th century, increasing literacy made the nation state possible. It made national identities possible. Well, something is happening in like terms with global Muslim identity. In this case it is not literacy so much as it is mass communications. I will just illustrate this with one factoid.

There was a Pew poll in June 2003 in which large majorities in eight of nine Muslim survey groups either "completely agreed" or "somewhat agreed" with the statement, "I feel more solidarity these days with Islamic people living around the world," and this was true in eight or nine of these countries, and you see it now, as well, in polling in the United States and in Europe, which was not a part of the Pew polling.

So as this imagined community grows, you get more and more Muslims in one place who are taking very seriously the travails of Muslims elsewhere, which is why you can get Muslims in London and Madrid responding with such alacrity to what they believe is happening to their co-religionists in Iraq.

Anti-Americanism, it really is growing. It is based on so many motifs that it is difficult to chip away at any one of them, let alone the whole thing. There is a letter by bin Laden which is quite interesting, and it illustrates this kind of grab bag approach to anti-

American rhetoric. It lashes the U.S. for capitalist rapacity, neo-colonial pretensions, propensity for violence, self-righteous hypocrisy, cultural depravity, degradation of women, and, incidently, for having the wrong religion.

So, you know, this is a very complex web of anti-American beliefs. It is very difficult to chip away at, and it is spreading.

I mentioned the social sciencey thing. You have got, in the Middle East especially, these sort of parallel societies because political activities have been criminalized, and just the very business of daily life is extremely complicated by intrusive and feckless bureaucracies, and so it is very difficult just to live one's life.

So informal networks have achieved a great deal in just getting some of these things done, whether you want to borrow money, whether you want to send your kid to school, whether you want to send money abroad if you are an entrepreneur and you don't want to deal with onerous regulatory and tax burdens, you just deal with your friends, and this parallel society, this kind of subterranean society, which is so necessary to the continuation of daily life, is a world in which radicalism and militancy can easily piggyback onto, and this way of living life is now very thoroughly proliferated and it has created a very durable home for militants.

Rules of war, let us just say that there is a debate among salafists now about who among the enemy it is legitimate to kill. At root, this is an argument about where the line lies between combatant and non-combatant. This is an important argument, and I raise it because the consensus that emerges will either put mass killers in the category of heretic, which would be good, or, if the consensus goes in the other direction, justify their actions and create a permissive environment for others who wish to join the fight on brutal terms. So we need to keep our eye on this, although we are not legitimate participants in the debate.

Now, the Committee staff asked for an assessment of jihadist objectives. As colleagues have pointed out, there are millions of people who are sympathetic to this cause and perhaps tens of thousands of jihadists around the world—we really don't know. It seems, on that basis, improbable that they have one shared war aim. But you can say that they want to raise the cause, to America and its allies, of maintaining a presence in the Muslim lands. They want to undermine regional governments whose cooperation makes American domination possible. They want to reform Muslim society to strengthen its powers of resistance, and they want to push America to do awful things that will incite greater hatred against it.

There is little room in this picture for a drive to conquest. Indeed, the jihadists describe themselves as "murabitoun" which are soldiers that go to the ramparts on the frontiers of Islam to defend it against others.

Mr. PENCE. If the witness could conclude.

Mr. SIMON. Yes, absolutely.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you.

Mr. SIMON. So what do we do? Well, first, we need to recognize that our presence in Iraq will seriously impede our efforts to influence hearts and minds. This may change if things work out better

in Iraq. At the moment that doesn't seem likely and that is going to be a problem.

But we can affect perceptions of the United States, and America's generous response to the 2004 tsunami that killed 100,000 people in Indonesia had a sharply positive effect on public opinion there, and the key factor appeared to be that the perception of the aid was that it was unconditional, so there is a lesson there.

We could also lower the temperature of anti-Americanism by engaging more energetically with the Israeli-Palestinian critics. I understand there are a lot of disincentives to that, but it is out there and it is important.

Finally, we could engage more energetically in diplomatic terms in local conflicts where Muslims are coming into conflict with the governments that rule them, and help those governments accommodate Muslim concerns before the jihadists co-opt those conflicts and cause the people involved in them to come after us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry it took so long.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN SIMON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE
EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

I would like to thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to speak on this vital topic.

I will concentrate on some of the key questions posed by the Committee: the nature and origin of Islamist extremism; factors contributing to its rise and those that could contribute to its demise; cohesion between groups, messages, and fatwas; and objectives—domestic or foreign; global, regional, or local.

My observations on these issues are personal. They do not reflect the view of the Council on Foreign Relations, which takes no position on these matters. They are also personal in that other analysts will probably have different answers to these questions, which is as it should be. The topic is complicated. And any discussion of Islam must acknowledge that in an important practical sense, there is no such thing. Rather, there is the complex issue of how Muslims interpret and live their faith. The fact that there are 1.4 billion Muslims settled on nearly every continent and which differ on the basis of ethnicity, race, nationality, sect, temperament, profession, class, and gender should suggest that all generalizations about "Islam" are suspect, or ought to be.

I will concentrate on seven of the conditions that I believe are relevant to the Committee's concerns today: first, the deep roots of the revival movement in which the jihad is embedded; second, the connection between contemporary salafism, what one might call hard Islam, and jihadism; third, the changing nature of clerical authority within the Islamic world; fourth, the globalization of Muslim identity; fifth, evolution of anti-Americanism among Muslims; sixth, the linkages between jihadism and persisting patterns of social organization, particularly in the Arab world; and seventh, the continuing debate over killing civilians in defense of Muslim interests. The point I wish to make here is that the jihad is mobilized and sustained by a wide range of interlocking conditions. Even if one or two of these conditions could be ameliorated, the remaining drivers would continue to propel it in our direction.

Other important factors, including the demographic and socio-economic determinants related to this global movement, the role of democratization, or the precise impact of the new media on Muslim opinion, as well as other significant drivers of militancy, I will leave to colleagues to discuss.

I will close by assessing the objectives of this movement and describing some response options available to us as a society and government.

Origins. The jihad can be traced back most clearly to the Arab reform movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The intellectual leaders of this broad initiative were dismayed by the parlous state of affairs in the region. The population was largely poor, educational and scientific achievements were few, and colonial administrations dominated government in those areas that an exhausted Ottoman empire no longer held sway. The evident decline of a once great civilization demanded both explanation and a strategy for renewal. Some prominent reformers laid the blame for decline on Muslims' estrangement from the roots of their religion. A combination of centuries of clerical obfuscation on the one hand and infatuation with

the West on the other had cut Muslims off from their spiritual roots. The sources of cultural vitality and confidence were lost. They could be regained, however, through direct access to scripture and the inspiration offered by the actions and experiences of Muhammad and his followers at the very dawn of the Islamic era. These were the *salaf al-salih*, the righteous ancestors. Fortified by renewed and strengthened faith, Muslims could take what they needed from the vast Western inventory of scientific and technological advances to improve the material condition of Muslim society and ultimately gain independence from foreign powers.

This brand of *salafism* evolved significantly since it emerged over a century ago in the Middle East. A pivotal figure in this transformation was an Egyptian intellectual and Qur'an commentator named Sayyid Qutb. Qutb, who was executed in Egypt in 1966, was the Solzhenitsyn of that time and place. An impassioned advocate of justice, he came to see the West as fundamentally corrupt and antithetical to Islamic values. He argued that the two worlds were irreconcilable. A reversion to the values of the *salaf*, the righteous ancestors, and reliance on the classic expressions of God's revelation would have to be accompanied by a rejection of the West. The devolution of earlier forms of *salafism* into more inward looking and rejectionist readings did not take place in a vacuum. During this period, the high expectations created by the difficult process of decolonization were unmet, while economic policies based on socialism failed to improve the standard of living, particularly in Egypt. At the same, post colonial Arab governments lost Palestine to the Jews, raising popular doubts about their legitimacy and competence. The *salafism* of Egyptian radicals cross-bred with the fundamentalism and xenophobia of Wahhabism at this time, as the Saudis provided sanctuary for the Muslim Brotherhood opposition then being persecuted by the Nasser regime in Egypt. A special reverence for the medieval scholar Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya was a feature of radical thinking, in part because of his insistence that without truly Islamic governance there could be no Muslim society and in part because of his apparent endorsement of rebellion against Muslim rulers who failed to enforce Islamic law in their domains. This was the reasoning that animated the assassins of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981. (It was Ibn Taymiyya who urged that jihad be included among the canonical "pillars of Islam.")

The Salafist Revival. Contemporary *salafism* forms the milieu in which jihadism thrives. It is not, however, the same thing as jihadism. Most *salafists* are pietistic, focusing on the reform of society through the reform of individual mores and pattern of behavior. Teaching and preaching are their tools. There are political engaged *salafists*, some of which are establishment clerics, while others are "privatized" preachers or social and political commentators committed to *salafi* goals. They will present governments with so-called memoranda of advice that urge reform, or build organizations that can lobby, or win new adherents by providing social, medical and educational services. Jihadists, who believe that Islam must be defended through armed struggle, are the minority of *salafists*, but they are obviously highly committed. The links between *salafism* and jihadism lie in *salafi* sectarian hostility to Christians, Jews and Shi'a and a literalist reading of the Qur'an, which contains a scattering of verses that valorize warfare against unbelievers. Whereas a mainstream cleric might contextualize these passages within the overall Qur'anic narrative and perhaps cast them as ideals appropriate to a very limited set of conditions, *salafists*, especially those who are self-educated, will read these verses in an unmediated way. The hardest edge to this part of the *salafi* spectrum is made up of the so-called *takfir*s, who believe it is permissible to kill Muslims whom they view as collaborators. The debate over the appropriateness of *takfir* is an old one. Some modern scholars in Saudi Arabia have tried to resuscitate the opposing concept of *irja*, which relegates the determination of apostasy to God, who alone is capable of knowing what is in a Muslim's heart. By and large such efforts have been unsuccessful.

Salafism seems to be burgeoning. It is a relatively uncomplicated doctrine and draws clear distinctions between right and wrong and us and them. It promises a secure personal identity and a role in the community. It eschews local, customary variations of Islamic practice, which enhances a sense of interconnectedness among *salafists* living in far-flung places. And it is imbued with the aura of authenticity that comes with notion that *salafism* is Islam as it was practiced by the first three generations of Muslims in Arabia.

Clerical Authority. The breakdown of clerical authority contributes to the easy elision of *salafism* and jihadism. Clerical control over scriptural interpretation and by extension over the actions of the community at large began to erode long ago. The process was hastened by colonial rule, which enhanced the status of technocrats over clerics, and then—inadvertently—by unpopular regimes that put the clergy on their payrolls. Co-opting the clergy for the purposes of the state undermined clerical

claims to independence, integrity and, of course, authority. As a result, there is now no universally credible and authoritative institutional brake on the current tendency to justify violence in religious terms, particularly against civilians.

A Globalized Identity. Just as the spread of literacy in 18th and 19th century Europe enabled the formation of national identities and the nation state, the spread of modern media has enabled Muslims the world over increasingly to see themselves as parts of the same community of shared interests, goals, concerns, achievements and grievances.

In Pew polling administered in June 2003, large majorities in eight of nine Muslim survey groups “completely agreed” or “somewhat agreed” with the statement: “I feel more solidarity these days with Islamic people living around the world.”¹ This was the case for 80% or more of respondents in Indonesia and Pakistan, while at least 70% of those surveyed in Lebanon, Nigeria, and Jordan agreed with the assessment. In addition, pluralities in Kuwait, Morocco, and the Palestinian Authority testified to a greater sense of solidarity. Increasing penetration of information technology, access to computers and satellite television will accelerate these trends by bringing Muslims together in what the sociologist Benedict Anderson called an “imagined community.” Muslim perceptions of growing threats to their religion can be expected to reinforce this process. This explains, in part, the alacrity with which Spanish and British Muslims carried out terrorist attacks to protest the fate of fellow Muslims in Iraq.

Anti-Americanism. Against the background of these developments, anti-Americanism had been rising in the Muslim, particularly Arab world. These sentiments mesh well with a school of religious thought, such as *salafism*, that deems other faiths inferior and by nature subordinate. But highly resonant anti-American motifs are common outside of the salafist framework as well. Many of these originated outside of the Muslim world entirely, especially in Europe, and were introduced to the region by Nazi and Soviet propaganda in mid-20th century and reinforced by views of the U.S. propagated within the non-aligned movement. Bin Laden’s long “Letter to the Americans” is a good example of this grab-bag approach to anti-American rhetoric. The document lashes the U.S. for its capitalist rapacity, neo-colonial pretensions, propensity for violence, self-righteous hypocrisy, cultural depravity, degradation of women, and, incidentally, for having the wrong religion. The substitution of American power in the region for British authority was bound to tar the U.S. with the imperialist brush. President Eisenhower’s rebuke of Britain’s Suez adventure in 1956 staved this off, but ultimately U.S. support for Israel would take its toll. For the most part, we have balanced our commitment to Israel’s security with our objectives in the Arab world fairly effectively. The intervention in Iraq, however, coupled with a perceived indifference to Palestinian suffering has upset this balance and reinforced anti-Americanism. The result has been a more receptive environment for recruitment of jihadists and a more permissive setting for their tacit supporters.

Here, too, the new media, especially satellite television and the Internet reinforce negative images of the U.S. through a flood of compelling, highly graphic images. Some of these images present the Muslims as victims; others as victors. All tend to frame events as segments of an ongoing good versus evil drama.

Parallel Societies. Islamic activism makes use of “dense associational networks of personal relationships that characterize much of the politics, economic activity and culture” in the region. Given the criminalization of political self-expression, intrusive and corrupt bureaucracies, and pervasive surveillance in some Middle Eastern countries, it is scarcely surprising that so much public activity is unlicensed and below the radar of the state. Informal networks allow entrepreneurs to avoid compliance with regulatory and tax burdens, send funds out of the country, borrow money, or enroll a child in school. Meanwhile, the exclusion of opposition groups from politics has led to the formation of informal organizations that in effect supplant a feckless state by setting up their own patronage networks and providing public services. These unofficial—and in some cases semi-clandestine—networks give radical activists a natural space in which to recruit new members, consolidate their growth, and operate undetected by the state.

Rules of War. There is a debate among salafists about who among the enemy may be legitimately targeted. At root, this is an argument about where the line lies between combatant and noncombatant. This is an important argument because the consensus that emerges will either put mass killers in the category of heretic, or, if the consensus goes in the other direction, justify their actions and create a permissive environment for others who wish to join the fight on brutal terms. At this point, the clerical debate is tacking to the right, with prestigious clerics like Yusuf

¹ The Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World,” Final Topline Results, 2003, pg 132

al Qaradawi, who condemned the 9/11 attacks, now maintaining that violence against Americans in Iraq—including civilian contractors—is permissible. At the other end of the spectrum, bin Laden has argued that all Americans in a democracy must necessarily be regarded as supporting the oppression of Muslims, because they voted for the leader who is implementing these oppressive policies. The logic of this argument puts all Americans in the category of combatant. The main source of restraint now seems to be the awareness of some in the jihadist camp that indiscriminate violence, or at least violence that takes Muslim lives, risks the loss of Muslim hearts and minds. Whether this cautionary stance will ever be applied to non-Muslim lives by jihadists remains to be seen, but must be regarded as unlikely.

Jihadist Objectives. The number of jihadists, or would be fighters, is unknowable, but educated guesses, like those of Scotland Yard, put the total in the thousands. That they all share the same definition of victory, or war aims seems improbable. What can be safely said is that the majority, to judge from web sites, religious opinions, statements of leaders, see themselves in a defensive war against a predatory power. Islam as a civilization is under attack and its historic domains are occupied or under the threat of conquest. From this perspective, Muslims are at the brink. The enemy occupies vast tracts of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Palestine, and Iraq while he exercises a more indirect but no less effective hegemony over Egypt and the states on the Arab side of the Gulf. Moreover, the enemy insidiously corrupts Muslims through a cultural penetration and seduces them with a web of lies that saps the will to resist. Something must be done. The program that seems to have emerged is (a) raise the cost to America and its allies of maintaining a presence in Muslim lands; (b) undermine the regional governments whose cooperation makes American domination possible; (c) reform Muslim society to strengthen its powers of resistance. There seems to be little room for conquest in this model. Indeed, jihadists describe themselves as *murabitoun*, “those who mount the ramparts” in defense of Islam’s borders.

It seems depressingly obvious that many who are imbued with this word-view will not be satisfied by merely conciliatory policy changes, to the extent that a broad assessment of U.S. interests justified such policy departures. Nor would unilateral U.S. actions mollify angry and marginalized European Muslims, who decide to lash out at the U.S. for the same reason the U.S. was targeted for having supported regimes that suppressed Islamist oppositions with such gusto. The fact is that the migratory process that brought millions of peasants to the cities of the Middle East and south Asia has carried millions of Muslims to the urban centers of Europe, thus expanding the geographic area of contention. Hence, whether jihadist aims or defensive or offensive seems to be decreasingly relevant. If the underlying grievances are local, but distributed globally, and expressed in the universalistic terms of jihadist rhetoric, boundaries begin to fade.

Policy responses. Pursuing democratization, even assuming it was in our power to bring it about, would almost certainly result in the accession of hostile governments in the region. Whether this would defang jihadism is open to question. In any case, the costs would be high.

The U.S. presence in Iraq will seriously impede American efforts to influence hearts and minds. Perhaps this will change if a pluralistic, functioning government takes shape and the level of violence diminishes, but such developments appear unlikely at this time. In the interim, our occupation will reinforce regional images of the U.S. as both excessively violent and ineffectual. These images are going to spur Muslims to attack us, or tacitly approve of those who do.

We can affect perceptions of the U.S., at least on the margin, in several ways. America’s generous response to the 2004 tsunami that killed more than 100,000 people in Indonesia had a sharply positive effect on public opinion there. The key appeared to be the perception that the aid was unconditional. There is a lesson here.

The U.S. can also lower the temperature of anti-Americanism by engaging more energetically in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. The key here would be to do so with a greater public acknowledgement of Palestinian grievances. Surely this would be possible without creating the appearance that Washington was either supporting a terrorist clique in Gaza, or weakening its historic commitment to Israel. Again, action taken now will not instantly disable the jihad, but, over time, it will erode the credibility of the jihadist claim that the West was implacably opposed to the Muslim world.

Finally, the U.S. should engage more actively through diplomacy in local conflicts that jihadists exploit and which would ultimately put the US in the jihadists’ gun-sights. A top U.S. intelligence official told me not long ago that when “we get whacked again, the attacker will have an Asian face.” Let me assure the sub-committee that he was not predicting an attack or that an attacker would necessarily be Asian. His point, rather, was that the U.S. was likely to be attacked by

someone who was radicalized in the course of a local conflict involving Muslim grievances, a conflict that had been hijacked by jihadists and forced to fit their global agenda. The way to stave off this alternative future is to work with countries such as Thailand and help them see their way toward a meaningful accommodation to Muslims in their midst. This would be an inexpensive investment with a potentially large yield.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Dr. Simon. Not long at all, very informative and provocative.

Dr. Hillel Fradkin who is the Director of the Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, an institute that has Indiana ties, the Hudson Institute. Greetings. You are recognized for 5 minutes and some change.

STATEMENT OF HILLEL FRADKIN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR ISLAM, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. FRADKIN. And some change. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and also to the other Members of the Committee for this invitation to speak on what is obviously a very important topic. Like others, I have submitted a complete testimony, so I will just here summarize the main points, especially in light of the time.

Mr. PENCE. All the witnesses' testimony will be included in the record.

Mr. FRADKIN. I want to say at the outset, since our Chairwoman referred initially to Sam Huntington's book, that his hearing caused me re-read it over the weekend, and I must say it holds up rather well 10 years after it was published.

I would also like to say that my experience of this subject, especially radical Islam, is now of some 30 years duration, and reflects that fact that I was a student of the late Pakistani theologian Faslur Rahman, who was among one of its first Muslim victims. I don't mean that he was killed by them, but he was driven out of his native Pakistan. So I have been thinking about this for awhile, and also thinking about what might, in the future, vindicate his efforts to fight back.

I will just give the points that I tried to make very, very schematically, and we can elaborate on them a little bit later.

First, to the question posed by this panel: Is there a clash of civilizations between Muslim civilization and modern Western civilization? I think that is the more precise question we are posing.

My answer is no or not yet. There is a class, a fundamental clash between radicalist Islam and Western civilization, and the question for the present and future is. Will the Muslim world embrace either in whole or in large part the radical perspective? Obviously, at the moment the outcome is in doubt, but for the last 30 years the trend lines have been mostly negative. During that period radical Islam has had no serious intellectual or theological rival. In fact, to the extent that there has been a very lively intellectual and theological discussion, it is within the world of radical Islam, and that remains the case today.

I tried to address the Committee's concerns on the issue of what radical Islam is, and what the nature of its clash with us is.

It seems to me that the most general and important thing to say about it is that it is a utopian movement, and thus really does bear some comparison with recent utopian movements like communism

and fascism. Its most fundamental similarity with them is the fact that, like them, it regards liberal democracy as its enemy, and radical Islam is increasingly clear and articulate on this point.

I offered some other evidence, but the most succinct statement was provided by Ayatollah Khomeini last spring who said the following:

“The bitter and venomous taste of Western liberal democracy, which the United States has hypocritically been trying to portray through its propaganda as a healing remedy, has hurt the body and soul of the Islamic Ummah, and burn the hearts of Muslims.”

Obviously, if that is what you think liberal democracy is doing to you, you will be really deeply hostile to it.

I should only add that radical Islam rejects liberal democracy at this point, and it is also articulate on this point, not only as undesirable for Muslims but for humanity as a whole. It seeks to destroy liberal democracy as such and sees itself on the road to doing so.

Now, this may seem very, very unlikely, and I trust it is unlikely. Nevertheless, that is what they think and that is what makes the clash so absolutely fundamental. This describes what may be called radical Islam's negative pull, but it, of course, has a positive one, and for this it looks to the Muslim past, a romanticized past even further back than Congressman Ackerman suggested, of Islamic purity, power, and glory, and it aims to restore it, and in this it seems to me to bear a similarity to fascism. However, it means to make that restoration universal, and in that respect it is more like communism.

What inspired radical Islam? Another question that the staff asked me to address. I think the most enduring and important reason is something to which Dr. Simon referred before, distress at the decline in the standing of the Muslim world from its former high position, and this plus the other things that I have just mentioned leads to the notion, very common now, that radical Islam has entirely modern roots.

I want to say there is a lot to this, but it is, in my opinion, somewhat of a misunderstanding. I want to stress this because I think this is now becoming a common understanding in policy discussions; that this is really just a modern manifestation.

The reason I think it is misleading is that Muslim history has known many movements of reform in the past, and radical Islam in some sense continues that and looks to those precedents, and this, I think, introduces, first of all, a complication in understanding it let alone dealing with it.

My final points are with regard to how we are dealing with it, and the forms of the questions that were addressed to me.

It seems to me at the level of anti-terrorist operations we have had some success but it is very mixed. Al-Qaeda still exists and seems to have reestablished itself in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. An equally important problem, maybe even more important, is the fact that the ideological vigor of radical Islam has not diminished and is in fact still growing, and this takes different forms.

There is the renewed vigor of radical Shiism, which I describe a bit in my full remarks, and there is the renewed vigor of radical Sunnism, particularly in the form of the renewed vitality of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the oldest and most widely established formal organization of radical Islam. It was, one could say, in something of an eclipse compared to al-Qaeda. That is no longer the case.

Now, our efforts to counter these developments would necessarily take the form of encouraging a serious Muslim alternative to radical Islam, and that is to some degree what we have been after, but it has borne relatively little fruit. This is not, I think, primarily our fault. Such an alternative needs to be the work of Muslims themselves, and there are some Muslims who are directed toward this goal, but they are to date relatively few and unorganized.

My present concern is that we may have already given up on this, and that concern derives from the fact that I am not sure we are any more particularly discriminating about whom we deal with. In particular, we seem increasingly to want to engage organizations and individuals who actually represent, or derive from, the radical movement. Still, the problem remains that we ourselves cannot speak for Muslims. So it seems to me our main option at the moment is to speak for ourselves, and this means two things at present.

The first, and I think this was referred to by our Chairwoman, to speak for our principles and to indicate that we have no intention of surrendering them. As obvious as that may seem, it actually is important to the fight because the radicals really do believe we will surrender them fairly easily. Why wouldn't we? They are corrupt principles and they have corrupted us.

The second is to speak for the facts. By this what I have in mind is that all too often, today at least, in the Muslim world discourse is divorced from the facts, and this has a lot of liabilities for them and for us. The most grievous I think is the abrasive conspiracy theories, including the notion that we were not attacked by Muslims, any Muslims on 9/11. A recent poll by Pew showed that approximately two-thirds of Muslims assert this. I am reluctant to believe that they actually believe it, but they do assert it worldwide.

And if this belief is embraced, it seems to me it leads to a situation where our actions, any actions can only be viewed as aiming at a war on Islam. I mean, after all, if we weren't attacked, what other business could we have out in the Muslim world but to be a war with it?

The radicals promote this view tirelessly both at home and abroad. I am not exaggerating to say that if and when this view takes hold completely we will find ourselves in a clash of civilizations and maybe a civilization war. We won't really have any choice.

I think I kept to my 5 minutes.

Mr. PENCE. Closer than anyone else. But if the witness would conclude.

Mr. FRADKIN. Yes, I do want to say one other thing about where this movement comes from and why it is so difficult, I think, at this juncture to deal with it, and that has to do with the experience of Islam over the past, with modernity over the past 100 years.

A lot of people ask, Well, why don't Muslims like other people sort of find what is good or bad in modernity, adapt it, appropriate it, and chart their course accordingly? And the answer is they did, and they have tried, and their experience has been one of failure, and that is why I date this sort of importance of the radical movement to their general world and also the Muslim world, in a way, to 30 years ago.

It was at that point, it seems to me, that all the earlier secular and modern movements had been looked to, which included nationalism, Arab nationalism, sometimes socialism, and so forth. Secularism was positively embraced in many quarters and was looked as the way forward, and 30 years ago it became increasingly apparent to everyone that that, at least those efforts on moderate lines were a failure.

It was at that point that the radicals who had been hanging around in a certain way for 50 years saying that this was going to be a failure got real importance, not that they didn't have an important role beforehand, but it was at that point that they really could say, we told you so, and begin to attract widespread support.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fradkin follows:]

Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Islam, Democracy and US Policy-Middle East and Central Asia Policy

**Hearing of the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia
Committee on International Relations
September 14, 2006**

**Remarks Delivered by Dr. Hillel Fradkin
Director, Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World
Co-editor, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*
Hudson Institute, Washington, DC**

Thank you for the invitation to speak this morning. Let me begin with the overall question posed: Is there a clash of civilizations? I believe it fair to say that the precise question is: is there a clash of modern Western civilization and Muslim civilization?

For the moment the answer is no or not yet and I hope that such a clash will be avoided. There is certainly a clash or conflict between radical Islam and Western Civilization. I hesitate to call that a clash of civilizations and prefer to speak of a clash of principles.

The question for the present and future is whether or not the Muslim world as a whole or in large part will embrace the radical perspective. At the moment the issue is in doubt but I am obliged to say that the trend lines over the past 30 years have been mostly negative. During that period radical Islam, which already had a substantial history behind it, emerged with a power heretofore unknown. This does not mean that its power is or has been complete. Many Muslims have not embraced it. On the other hand, for 30 years it has operated in an environment where it has had no serious and organized intellectual and theological rival. That remains the case today. In fact, in many ways the most vigorous debates within the Muslim world are within the radical camp. For this and other reasons it has an appeal well beyond its core group of adherents. That appeal could well grow and would leave us with a war of civilizations.

Later on I will try to say a few things about why this state of affairs exists as well as how it might change. But I should begin with the first question I was asked to address: What are the nature and origins of radical Islam and the kind of threat it poses?

At the outset, radical Islam may be best described generally as a utopian movement. As such it bears comparison with other recent utopian movements such as Communism and Fascism. And historically speaking it was interested in both and sometimes borrowed from both.

It could do so because it could and did understand itself to share with them a common enemy. That enemy is best defined as liberal democracy and I must stress the word “liberal” in this formula.

That remains its enemy today and it is increasingly clear and articulate on this point whichever of the two main branches of radical Islam to which one refers, either radical Shiism or radical Sunnism. As for the former, it was made clear in Pres. Ahmadinejad’s recent letter to Pres. Bush which in my opinion did not receive the attention it deserved. As for radical Sunnism, I may refer you to the statement of Abu Musab al Zarqawi issued in Jan. 2005 on the eve of the Iraqi elections of that month. Beyond them, there are many statements to this effect in radical literature and pronouncements. But perhaps the most succinct was offered by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Guide and therefore supreme ruler of Iran last spring. He said as follows:

“The bitter and venomous taste of Western liberal democracy which the United States has hypocritically been trying to portray through its propaganda as a healing remedy, has hurt the body and soul of the Islamic Ummah and burned the hearts of Muslims.”

I only need add that radical spokesmen are opposed to liberal democracy not only as a potential future for Muslims but for any human beings whatsoever. They believe they are on the road to destroy liberal democracy simply. However unlikely that may seem to be it is what makes the clash between us and radical Islam absolutely fundamental.

But thus far, I have described only its negative pole – what it wants to destroy? What of its positive pole or vision of the future?

For this, radical Islam looks to the past, a romanticized past, of Islamic purity, power and glory and longs to restore it. That longing was bred of the fact that in the past the Muslim world as a whole enjoyed a position in the world far superior to one it enjoys today and from which it suffered a spectacular decline. Because of this longing for the past and its romanticization of that past, radical Islam seems more nearly to resemble Fascism among modern utopian movements. To that may be added its marked glorification of and enthusiasm for violence and its celebration of courage as the principal virtue. Where it most resembles Communism is in its universalism.

Up to now, I have spoken of radical Islam as a general phenomenon. I could do so because in some way or other all strands of radical Islam share both these negative and positive poles.

Nonetheless there are several strands. These have different origins of time, place and historical context. Moreover, they can and do have different visions of the

past they want to restore. The most dramatic such difference is between radical Shiism and radical Sunnism, which have very different views of what the original state of Islam and its polity was or should have been. Finally, there are differences regarding the appropriate strategy and tactics to use for pursuing their goals. For example, some radical groups have avoided violence not as a matter of principle but as a matter of present tactics. But I should add that this does not make them any less radical. Nor does it mean that they are not troublesome now and in the future. Their activities continue to expand the influence of radical Islam generally. Of course this means an increase in the pool from which terrorists may emerge. But equally important is the political force this creates, both at home and abroad, which will inevitably try to cause us harm.

The fact of these differences does mean that the various radical Islamic strands may be rivals with one another. But it does not mean that they cannot and do not cooperate with one another under certain circumstances. Over time some have practically speaking undergone a merger.

Of course the details of all this are important but given our time I will limit myself more or less to enumerating what the main strands are or have been.

The most recent is radical Shiism which was born so to speak in the mind of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who founded the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As for Sunnite strands, the most ancient has its origins in 18th century Arabia and today commonly goes by the name of Wahhabism, after Abdul ibn al Wahhab its founder.

Another major strand had its origins in 19th century India in what is known as the Deobandi movement but was given its present form and organization by a 20th century Muslim named Maulana Maududi.

The third and latest Sunnite strand had its origins in Egypt in the 1920's and was embodied in the organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Founded by a man named Hassan al Banna, it was the first truly formal radical Islamic organization and partially because of its organizational skills succeeded in establishing branches in many parts of the Muslim world and has today many branches outside of that world – for example Europe and the United States. The movement it represents is often referred to as Salafism. This term means that it looks back to the Salaf, the ancestors, or more precisely the virtuous ancestors, the Salaf as Salih.

Some of these movements have undergone various subdivisions and this plus the facts I mentioned earlier have produced rivalries. On the other hand there have also been mergers or quasi-mergers. For example, because of events in the 60's and thereafter Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood grew closer together such that it is often difficult to distinguish between Salafism and Wahhabism.

Indeed today the most general distinction among Sunni groups commonly used is between Salafi and Jihadi, with the former characterized by reservations, however partial, about the use of violence. More recently this distinction has also partially turned on the question of the propriety of participating in elections.

As I said before, despite the differences among these strands all are somehow the product of a sense of Muslim decline, especially vis a vis the rise of what is called modernity and its exemplars, originally the modern European powers of the 19th and 20th century, and attempts to redress the situation.

But I need to add that Muslim concern about Muslim decline and Muslim movements founded to address such concerns are not unique to the modern period. There were many such movements in the past, well back in the past – from the 7th century down at least to the 15th century - which is to say long before Europe or the West was a significant factor in Muslim affairs and Muslim thinking. For this reason and for the additional reason that radical Islam takes its orientation from the past, this has meant that radical Islam can and has looked to the past for guidance in these precedents. One particularly powerful and well-known example is the extraordinary interest in and influence of a Muslim thinker, known as Ibn Taymiyyah who lived in the 13th and 14th centuries.

I mention this because in recent discussions of radical Islam, especially policy discussions, there has arisen a pronounced tendency to regard radical Islam as exclusively modern in character because of its similarities to non-Muslim modern movements. I think this something of a misunderstanding and temptation, though a natural one. For to regard it as I have suggested as something of a mixture complicates the question of whether and how the current power of radical Islam might diminish.

But how might it diminish or disappear altogether? How well has the US government handled the war against this threat? What might one recommend? These were the final questions I was asked to address and will do so in a moment.

But it is useful and appropriate to raise and briefly touch upon another question: How did radical Islam become so powerful in the first place? Why did some Muslims incline themselves to look to the past for answers to their problems? Why in more recent times, the last 30 years, have so many Muslims been drawn to this orientation? Why didn't Muslims seek to appropriate and adapt the modernity which they encountered to their own purposes as other peoples have done and are still doing?

The short answer is they did beginning in the late 19th century. In fact it is a curious and even tragic fact that the movement I referred to earlier as Salafism has its origins in precisely such an attempt. Its religious and intellectual founder was a man named Muhammed Abduh who was the Sheikh or rector of Al Azhar Univ.

Abduh attempted the elaboration of what we might call a liberal or progressive Islam which sought to appropriate that which he thought was useful and even necessary in modern ideas and institutions. Unfortunately most of his students and disciples eventually took a different path. But the main efforts to appropriate modernity took place outside a more strictly religious framework. They entailed the establishment of the modern nation states into which the contemporary Muslim world is still divided and the embrace of nationalism, secularism and sometimes socialism. This gathered particular steam in the post colonial period after WWII.

The problem was and is that the modern state failed to deliver much if anything that seemed positive. Most of these states became dictatorships either of the military or one-party variety. In addition to the denial of political participation, they were also incapable of providing meaningful material progress. For these and other reasons they were also incapable of addressing the need or desire for enhanced dignity.

This failure began to become clear at the end of the 1960's. Radical Islam was the beneficiary. It had continued as a minority voice during this period often persecuted by the modern state. In the context of the failure of the modern state this permitted it to say that only it had the answers and to receive a receptive hearing.

There are other important and well-known parts of the history of the past 30 years - the spread of Wahhabism through petrodollars, the Afghan Jihad and other matters - but this will have to suffice for the present.

Let me return to and end with the last questions: How are we doing? How might we do better?

Clearly the most urgent question is how are we doing on terrorism? I am a private citizen and do not have access to classified information. So I must judge by what a well-informed person can see. Insofar as I judge from the fact that we have not suffered another attack like that of Sept. 11, 2001, I may say that we are doing pretty well. On the other hand, al-Qaeda still exists and even if its capacities have been degraded, as I think they have, it still remains potent especially in Iraq.

But more worrisome is the fact that even if al Qaeda might be somewhat in decline, other radical forces are enjoying renewed vitality. I have in mind in two: one is radical Shiite forces including the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah. Although the current Iranian regime is still broadly unpopular within Iran, Ahmadinejad has given the regime a new lease on life by reviving the revolutionary spirit of the cadres on which the regime depends. On the Sunnite side of things I have in mind the renewed vitality of the Muslim Brotherhood which had success in the most recent Egyptian elections and which scored an outright victory in the Palestinian elections through the success of Hamas which is its Palestinian branch. I should add that many parts of the radical movement hailed the Hamas victory not

as a victory for Palestinians but for the movement as a whole. For by their lights there is now once again a radical Sunni state a so-called Islamic state. Such states ceased to exist with the end of the Taliban regime.

But this leads me necessarily to go beyond the issue of terrorism to what is to my mind the most worrisome question of the radical ideology which informs the movement and what progress has been achieved in combating it. For without success in this sphere we will continue to face a great threat even were al Qaeda to disappear.

Here I regret to say I see no progress at all. In fact the appeal of radical Islam may be growing as we see from events in Europe over the past few years. In the Middle East this is partially a function of the fact that radicals can point to some successes – the ones I just mentioned. But it is also a function of the fact that – in the Middle East and elsewhere – radical Islam still lacks any serious Muslim intellectual let alone organizational rival.

One cannot easily fault the US Government on the ideological front. After all the elaboration of a Muslim vision which would serve as an alternative to radical Islam can ultimately only be achieved by Muslims themselves. Although some have stepped forward to take up that task they remain very few.

On the other hand, one can hardly be impressed by the actions so far taken to support a so-called “moderate” Muslim alternative. By and large these have operated on the plane of what might be called “practical” democracy. The idea seems to be that if we could get some Muslims to acquire the experience of democracy if only at the civic level this would move things, sooner or later, in a benign direction.

In fairness, one must say it is too soon to know whether this might work. But already it has encountered some problems.

First if experience of democracy were sufficient one would not encounter radical Muslims let alone terrorists within the minority Muslim communities located within Western democracies. But as a matter of fact we do and quite a few – for example Great Britain. This points to the fact that ideology remains a very potent factor that is unaddressed by this model.

The current administration implicitly takes note of this issue in its just released *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* but only indirectly and inadequately.

Second, insofar as our government tries to advance this effort by interacting with existing Muslim organizations which define themselves religiously it winds up dealing with organizations and personnel who are themselves radical. This is true both at home and abroad and is a result of the fact that almost all such

organizations, with very few exceptions, are radical in their origins and in their present orientation. In particular, most owe their origins to the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood and/or Wahhabi institutions.

This too is not a problem of the US Government's making. In the best case, Muslims would have founded rival organizations in the past. I can well understand the frustration at not finding them. But the government seems increasingly indifferent to who it is dealing with. This can only serve to discourage real alternatives as I know from talking to Muslim friends and colleagues.

All this is to say that in the long run, there is probably no substitute for serious intellectual and ideological endeavor. But I see very little sign of an appreciation of that fact in official statements of our strategy let alone the actions of our government. There is one exception – Gen. Abizaid who has been unusually eloquent and forceful on this subject. But he has as you know many other pressing responsibilities and this is not usually the work of the armed forces.

In the short term it seems the problem is that Muslims will not or cannot speak in a moderate vein for themselves and that we cannot speak for them. But if that is the case we can at least speak for ourselves and would recommend that we do.

In part, this means forcefully enunciating the principles of our civilization – the principles of liberal democracy – and informing our adversaries that we have no intention of surrendering them. Of course, this latter statement will sometimes have to be delivered with armed force. But it is not by that circumstance not an argument. If and when it comes to be appreciated by the majority of Muslims if not the diehard radicals themselves that radical Islam is yet another dead end it may create favorable conditions for alternatives.

But another useful and more concrete addendum would be speaking on behalf of the facts – especially the facts of recent history. Those facts will sometimes be favorable and sometimes unfavorable to us. But in both cases it will be helpful insofar as it encourages contemporary Muslim discourse to show a similar respect for the facts. This is woefully lacking at present and finds its most extreme expression in conspiracy theories – above all in the notion that we attacked ourselves on 9/11. In this context, only radical views of the present relation between Western and Muslim Civilization can prevail. For if after all we were not truly attacked on 9/11, our present actions and policies can only mean we are at war with Islam rather than those radicals who mean to do us harm. That we are at war with Islam is the consistent message of the radicals overseas. I regret to say that it is frequently the message of Muslim leaders at home. If and when that view prevails we will be involved in a war of civilizations. We will have no other choice.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Dr. Fradkin.

I know my colleagues are interested in asking questions. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes to start the conversation. But thank you to all the witnesses for very proactive and informative statements.

It seems to me this hearing and the Chairman's decision to call this hearing is very timely given the President's remarks to the nation on Monday night. He made remarks that could have framed our discussion before you received your notice in the mail. I am quoting the President on Monday evening this week when he said, "This struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth," he said, "it is a struggle for civilization. We are fighting to maintain the way of life enjoyed by free nations."

Mr. Blankley, I was very intrigued by your comments about what you believe is a failure to bring consensus to appreciate the nature of the threat, and Dr. Fradkin, it seemed to me, got me a little bit closer to the President's statement and to my own instinct when he said that it seems there is a clash between radical Islam and the Western world.

In your comments, Mr. Blankley, you spoke about the 15th century and a discontinuity of history. Do you see radical Islam because of the alienation from the West that Dr. Simon and others spoke of? Do you see radical Islam becoming, in effect, in the next decade or two, the manifestation of Islamic civilization and is that the nature of the threat?

Mr. BLANKLEY. Well, I don't have any way to judge how far and how wide it will expand. My sense is that it is sufficiently spread now that for our purposes it is a vastly formidable challenge to us.

I would respectfully demur from the President's characterization. I know it has become popular to say that it is a struggle between civilization and barbarity, et cetera, and while it is certainly my sense and perhaps your sense of civilization that is true. We think civilization is the standard by which you judge whether the people are civilized or not, but it is a little presumptuous to argue that, what may become the dominant force in a fifth of mankind in a civilization that has been going on for a millennium and a half, is not a civilization simply because it has vastly different approaches.

I mean, comparing Athens and let us see—who can help me on the other country the Athens fought—

Mr. SIMON. Sparta.

Mr. BLANKLEY. Sparta. Thank you. You know, the Athenians doubtlessly saw Sparta as uncivilized in some way. They had a completely different approach to how humans should be organized, but they were both substantial entities.

So, I don't know. It moves toward name calling to say we are civilized and everybody else isn't. It is enough for us to characterize, and it is danger to us, and try to develop strategies and tactics to protect ourselves. Whether it is a civilization or a barbarity, I will leave it to scholars to deduce.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, and my only other question would be to Dr. Cagaptay. I was very fascinated with your comments about Turkey and what is happening there. It seems to me that Turkey is an example of a predominantly Islamic country that has demonstrated an interest in support for democracy and markets. But

the question I would have is, is your sense that Attaturk is being rebuked there because he moved from the Arabic alphabet to the Latin alphabet 75 years ago, and he turned the compass of Turkey to the West? It would seem to me to be a very significant historical development if you thought Turkey was in effect rebuking Attaturk's decision to look West and was looking back to the Arab world.

I have been as troubled as many policymakers about the hospitality shown to Hamas and Syria and others. Some of that could be understood as being in the neighborhood, but it seemed to me if I understood you right that you were saying that it was more than that. I wondered if you might respond.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I can bring some insight to this discussion as a historian and analyze Attaturk's legacy for Turkey, when he reformed Turkey in the '20s and '30s. You highlighted the idea of switching alphabets, but that was also for Turkey a change of its identity that it would as a Muslim country identify with the Western culture, that it would switch its alphabets, although written in Arabic, to Latin.

And I think if you go through that you realize that Attaturk's legacy has three components. One is a secularism deeply entrenched, the second is democracy, and third is Turkey's Western orientation. It is not an accident that after World War II, long after Attaturk died, Turkey opted to join the NATO and support the Western world, because that is the path on which Attaturk had set the country and said Turkey's choice is with contemporary Western civilization.

So what is going on today then, I think, serves as erosion of Attaturk's legacy because the country's Western orientation is literally coming undone as we speak, and we discussed that. In my view, a Turkey that is not Western, meaning a Turkey that does not belong to Western institutions, does not identify with the Western world, is not part of the Western family of nations, is going to have a very hard time staying secular and democratic.

It will increasingly look like Malaysia, which is a rubber-stamp democracy, which is not secular, and which is definitely anti-Western, and less like Turkey, as the country that we know. That is why I think the continuation of the current foreign policy orientation of the country with Iran and Syria and the distancing from both the EU and the United States is a dangerous sign. I can't see how Turkey could remain secular and democratic if it is not Western.

Mr. PENCE. Thank you. With that, I will yield for 5 minutes to the Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, for questions.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank the Chair.

Let me say how pleased I am especially to see Mr. Blankley. We have a conversation every Sunday morning, and my wife finds it remarkable how calm you stay no matter how much I yell at you on rare occasions. [Laughter.]

I think one of the things that we have to look at is the nature of religion as a background to all this, and that is basically faith. Doctor, you were almost embarrassed to say that the results of a poll showed 60 percent of Muslims believing that Muslims had nothing to do with 9/11, but faith does that. You know, I think a

greater percentage of Christians believe that there was someone who could walk on water, and a majority of Jews believe that somebody was able to wave a rod and split the sea and walk through. This is a faith thing, and there is almost no accounting for it when people really want to believe something.

The question is how do you impact their belief system into what is a generalized review as reality or the real world, and a lot of people don't live in the real world. I think that when people are devoid of hope they retreat to belief because that gives them some comfort and some basis to understand or excuse the fact that they don't understand.

I also think that the major monotheistic religions, with the exception of Islam, have all gone through a reformation. Islam has not. Other religions have, at least, gotten a foot into whatever the current century was while clinging to basic belief, and we don't sacrifice animals anymore even though we are commanded to both in the Old and New Testaments. I guess there are still a few countries that do murder murderers, but most of the Western world doesn't beat muggers or rape rapists, or do the literal translations, we do interpretations. Islam has not gone through that.

And I think that when people are impoverished, not well educated, lacking sophistication about what is going on in the rest of the world because of the circumstances that we can probably all agree on, that they have to have something to believe in, and it is the old-time religion. It is promising people pie in the sky when they die because you can't promise them anything that you can deliver while they are here on earth that they think is realistically within their grasp, and pie in the sky, if you are hungry, is not a bad deal.

Of course, the younger people, they promise something that might be more enticing to them than pie. You reach a certain age pie ain't a bad deal. Nonetheless, you know, one of the questions is, Will Islam go through some kind of reformation or transformation? Will it be allowed in the world of Islam?

I think another major question is assimilation. The world is getting smaller and populations are interchanging, intermingling, and this country is made up of groups of people, and one of the things that puzzles us and astound us and confuse us and angers us is when we look at some of the Islamic community and they don't self-criticize. They wouldn't, as the statistics that were brought out in your testimony, indicate. In Britain, as Mr. Blankley points out, they wouldn't turn somebody in if they thought they were going to blow up society. They don't want to relate to people from all over the world. They have not adjusted.

You know, the Kennedy question, is he loyal to the Pope or loyal to America, dual loyalty questions about Jews that have surfaced in history from time to time. We have gotten over most of that and most people have blended into society whilst keeping their identity. Muslims have not made that jump, and I don't think it is because the Muslims who came to the United States want to make it part of the caliphate, although there are probably few exceptions, or in the case of migrating to Britain or anyplace else.

Part of the world's problem, that hypocrisy that was mentioned, cited by—

Mr. FRADKIN. Khamenei.

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Khamenei, I mean, it is really there. It is really there. They have legitimate grievances. When the world colonized the Islamic world, the United States, if it was around at the time, was around for a lot of it, a lot of it afterwards, nobody jumped in to free them of their European colonizers. It is only when there was a Muslim oppressor that we have done things like that.

I think it would have stood us in much better stead after we pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein if we would have declared victory and got on our ships, and hopefully would have been invited back to consult on certain things. We would have been heroes. But there is a tremendous resistance to that humility, and humiliation that they have suffered throughout history at the hands of whoever, whenever, but always, and I think that is part of the problem.

The question is, and it is different, I guess, than the question we started out with, and I think it was you, Mr. Blankley, that said we can't agree on the nature of the enemy in this country. I think that is a question that should have been agreed to 5 years ago. I mean, how do you get into a fight, how do they try to send you into the ring, if you don't know who you are fighting and what their likely moves are, et cetera?

It is a real late question, and we could look back at that, but I think the immediate thing we have to do is look forward. How do we cope with this clash because Western logic is competing with Islamic sense of inferiority, which has now been supplanted by whatever substitutions for nationalism in a world or a concept without borders? And can we compete on that basis?

Mr. PENCE. Would any of the witnesses like to respond?

Mr. BLANKLEY. Let me just make a couple of brief statements. I will bow to the scholars on the history of reform in Islam but I believe it has happened a number of times, but it reformed back toward literalism rather than toward secularization as one might hope.

As far as, you know, that we should have known 5 years ago what the nature of the enemy or the purpose of the war was, yes, of course we should have, but it is not uncommon for the purpose of the war to change. Civil War famously from observing the union to freeing the slaves, and also the sense of the magnitude of the challenge often changes. Usually the level of ferocity advances, whether it is in a civil war, World War I, World War II, they all start off more tentative and then as you get into it, it becomes more ferocious. That is the typical pattern. I would expect to see that in the future.

As far as assimilation, I will just mention the polling data in Britain, which is the best data I found for Muslims in Europe. The polling was more extensive there, that the trend line is against assimilation. The percentage of British Muslims who want to be assimilated is going down, and interestingly the globalization project you talk about and one world and coming together, you see all over the world having the opposite effect.

When I was in England last week, I saw a lot of flags with the cross of St. George, which is England's flag rather than the Union

Jack which is Britain's flag. You see peoples breaking back down to their smaller cultural unit. So I think it is not only Muslims who are responding to the globalization project by coming back to culture, and it is a danger around the world.

Mr. PENCE. Would other members of the panel like to respond briefly?

Mr. FRADKIN. Yes.

Mr. PENCE. Let us begin with Dr. Fradkin.

Mr. FRADKIN. I too want to talk a little bit about the issue that was raised by Congressman Ackerman of defining our enemy, and I think it is a very fair criticism that it has taken way too long to do so. I am not sure we actually are even yet at that point. But on the other hand, I don't think it is altogether a surprise, and I think one could appreciate that if one compares a radical Islam or that which is our enemy to say communism or fascism, when we were fighting communism, we declared ourselves against it. It called itself communism, so we were all pretty much on the same page but on opposite sides. The same was in a way true of fascism.

The problem in this case is that the radicals, both the actual jihads and the salafists say that they represent Islam, and a lot of people credit that claim, and I think from the very beginning, from the day after 9/11 the problem was, How do respond to this without saying we were—accepting that self-definition and saying we were at war with Islam?

So we came up with a formula of terrorism. I mean, I think it was less than 24 hours before people said that there was something wrong with that formula because terrorism was a means and not an end. Among other things, it was unlikely we were going to go out and fight the Tamil Tigers, and so forth. But we were and I think still are a bit frightened of how to define this in such a way as not to find ourselves at work with the 1.4 billion Muslims that you described before.

The other thing that it occurs to me to say, I mean, we keep edging closer and closer to this, but I don't think we actually have an approved name for what war we are on.

The other thing I want to say about the complications of this struggle, and I have some sympathy for what you were saying before about Iraq, but I think one has to look back to 9/11 and see the situation we were in then, and the complications that arise from the fact that on the one hand we are dealing with some kind of radical global movement, which has its various subdivisions, and on the other hand we are dealing also still with the states.

In a certain way we were attacked on 9/11 because we were in Saudi Arabia. That was the original grievance bin Laden had, and the one he continued to assert as the primary reason for his hostility to us and to the Saudi regime. Of course, he portrayed that as an assault on the territory of Islam an assault on the holy places.

From our perspective, it just looked like what you had to do to protect Saudi Arabia, the oil fields, from Saddam Hussein, and who might otherwise have gone after them either in 1991 or afterwards, and we had a reasonable policy under the Clinton Administration of trying to contain that, but that policy one could say, and I am not objecting to it, cost us 3,000 lives on 9/11.

So the question was on the one hand we have this murderous tyrannical state to deal with. On the other hand we have this murderous and tyrannical radical national global movement to deal with. Just how exactly does one deal with both of those things at the same time? And I think that was the dilemma. Whether we saw that dilemma properly is another question, but that was the problem.

Mr. PENCE. I want to recognize Dr. Cagaptay, but I am going to yield the gavel to my colleague from Nebraska while I attend to constituents, but I want to ensure every panel member has the opportunity to respond to the Ranking Member's questions during this time.

So with that, Dr. Cagaptay.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think we are, as the discussion becomes more crystallized, dealing with two questions here. The first is the issue of whether we have a problem with Islam, and the second is, which version of Islam? So I would like to briefly look at these two questions.

Firstly, I for one am not fond of the term "Muslim world" because I think it blurs the threat and issues that we are facing. I think that the threat that we face is one of political instability, international jihadist terror, and anti-Americanism threat, basically specific to certain parts of the Muslim world.

The first of which is the Arab world, the Arab countries, over 20 of them, not a single one a democracy, all basically producers of international terrorism, or most. The second is the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater which I think has become a source of instability and terror and anti-Americanism since the Afghanistan war, but as a result of the border, that is Afghan and Pakistan issue; and the third Iran, which is a theocracy that is about to gain a nuclear weapon, and what that leaves us with is less than half of the Muslims, and the other half live in Southeast Asia, in India, in Turkey, in the Balkans, in Russia, in North America and Western Europe, but we are not seeing these kind of problems that identify with the earlier three areas.

But what we do see, to go back to Congressman Ackerman's question, is this idea of a spilling-over effect where I think more and more issues identified with these three regions are becoming issues for the global Muslim community, and I think sponsors of anti-Americanism, sponsors of terrorists, sponsors of political instability are able to do that for two reasons: One, because of the amount of oil money that is now available in the Arab world, and it is everywhere in the Muslim world, whether to build mosques, to train radicals, to sponsor and fund Islamist regimes and political parties, things that we are not doing.

So it seems to me that for the lack of a better term there is an Islamist international—again a comparison to the Cold War—that is out there that is very active, that has billions of dollars, that has a vision, a utopian vision and that it is doing everything to implement that vision.

So the problem we are facing therefore is not the problem from the Muslim world but it is a fight within the Muslim world. Instability spilling out from these three theaters to the rest of the Muslim world and affecting us as well, and that, I think, is a danger—

to go back to the specific case of Turkey that I discussed—because if you look at Turkey, you know, the ideal is there, one vision of Islam. Turkey is one clear case where that argument falls apart.

After all, this is a country where people for such a long time have practiced what is commonly known as Turkish or Balkan-Islamic faith that is open to other faiths, a country where people see Jews and Christians as neighbors, and not as enemies, and a country, where I remember President Bush's last visit to Istanbul he gave a speech at part of Istanbul's architecture where there is a mosque, a synagog and the church, a Greek church all sitting together sharing the garden walls under a Bosporus Bridge which spans Europe and Asia next to a nightclub which is filled with 5,000 people a night, and that is Turkey.

I think that is the kind of Turkey that is under threat right now with the Islamist international which is aiming to homogenize the practice of Islam across the Muslim world and make sure that this kind of diversity does not exist anymore.

So it seems to me that more so than people in the West—the people most threatened by the rise of radical Islamism, terrorism, instability are those people in the Muslim world who actually are not Islamists or anti-Islamists, and feel the threat more so than we do because they actually live inside the world.

Mr. FORTENBERRY [presiding]. Mr. Simon, did you want to respond as well to Mr. Ackerman's questions.

Mr. SIMON. Just very briefly. There is another trend at work which is progressive and relatively secular in orientation. It is largely composed of intellectuals.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Can I interrupt you, if you will yield for a second?

Mr. SIMON. Yes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I wonder if we ought to be careful with the word "secular" because it somehow implies irreligious. Do you understand the distinction?

Mr. SIMON. And it is well taken.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And that is not what I mean.

Mr. SIMON. I tried to account for that by saying—I am sorry, I forgot what I said. But it is something like more of secular orientation, but that was just to mean it was a clumsy way of trying to—

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I am not accusing you of that. All of these questions are on the table.

Mr. SIMON. But it was, it was kind of an officious way of trying to say, well, look, you know, not everybody is insisting that religion be first and foremost in every calculation regarding what one does, how one relates to others and so forth.

These views are put forth mostly by intellectuals, and just take a look at us. Who reads us? Well, I mean, Mr. Blankley has a lot of readers, but you know, intellectuals don't have a huge market, and if you think English intellectual writing is bad, you should see Arabic intellectual writing.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So is that why you are suggesting more Members of Congress aren't here? [Laughter.]

Mr. SIMON. Not at all, Mr. Chairman.

But all I am saying here really is that this brand of thinking, this trend in thinking doesn't have a lot of traction at the popular level.

Now, you do have others like Terry Grummet in Europe, in Geneva, who writes about the ways in which Islam as a set of beliefs and practices can be compatible with the liberal values of Western Europe, and he spells this case out in some detail, and many people question his sincerity, and they look at subtleties in his argument which seem to indicate, well, perhaps a bit of evasion on some central questions regarding the legitimacy of democracy, and so forth.

But nevertheless he is a popular voice, his works have been translated into something like 15 languages, who is arguing that there is some comparability.

Now, you know, his approach, just to be a little more specific, is to say, there is comparability but Islam is a legitimate alternative to the Western way of doing things, and one of the reasons we want to coexist in a kind of congenial, amenable manner with our Western Christian counterparts is that we want to be here to be the alternative for those who wish to have it.

So there are such alternatives, but for the most part this debate is moribund outside of the Salafi framework which my colleague, Dr. Fradkin, pretty much made clear.

Now, with the salafi framework there is huge debate. It is fervent and it is dynamic, and it is not all somehow against our interests or Western interests. These are Muslims who are trying to figure out where it is they go from here.

I would just add that the Muslims who are sympathetic to militancy or to radicalism, they are not like the Klingons, some race from outer space that has some kind of hate Americans gene planted in their body. There are reasons, as my colleagues have expressed, for these sentiments, and we need to pay careful attention to those as we are today.

Mr. BLANKLEY. Let me just make a brief comment, and I agree with Mr. Simon regarding the magnitude and power of the moderate reform wing or this lack of it to be precise. I think that the thing that has concerned me so much is that so many of us both in government and elsewhere are in denial about the likely prospects for the near and middle future, and we grasp at hopeful straws like the imminent victory of moderation in a world which is clearly going in the other direction. Even if it is the case that the final resolution of this conflict generations perhaps from now will be when the passions that are engaging radicalism will have gone out and will return to some normalcy—well, what used to be considered normalcy—the chronology of that is not going to be consistent with protecting ourselves unless we assume that in the shorter term the forces that we don't like to note are in the ascendancy, and even at their current size, if they are not ascendent, a lethargic prospect, and of course, when you combine these passions with the availability, the plausible availability of weapons of mass destruction to any substantial group of people on the planet today, that is the danger.

I worry that when we say, well, this is going to be decided by winning the hearts and minds. Well, yes, maybe it will at the end

of the century or some late time, but we have to deal with the grim reality that faces us now, and not just hope that the moderate voices that we are looking for will suddenly become dominant.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Dr. Cagaptay? Did I pronounce it correctly?

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Cagaptay.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Cagaptay. I am sorry.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you. I would say at least part of post-9/11 U.S. policies we are discussing the issue of, you know, where allies or enemies are, it is a work in progress, and I think that confusion we see also applies to the question of who our allies are across Muslim countries.

Just, I think, to answer the question, it is good to make the following statement. All Islamists are Muslims, but not all Muslims are Islamists, at least not yet. I think that sort of gives us the answer of who are allies are, that we are looking for Muslims who are not Islamists and who are actually making the choice themselves within Islam right now against Islamism, and they need all the support they can get from us: Financial, institutional, ideological, governmental, whatever you have.

The decision we are making in the Muslim world is not between those who are Muslims and who are not. It is between Muslims who are subscribing to this utopian revolutionary, violent world view, and those who are not, and it seems to me that the sooner we clarify that argument of who our allies are, the better we will have chances of supporting them inside the Muslim countries.

Final point, the question of whether our allies are people who are moderate, moderate Islamists, that was a term circulated in Washington for a while after 9/11, now it is not so much in coinage, but I have problems with that term as well simply because I really don't think—I was born and raised in Turkey, I think it is a term that has little utility. Here is why.

When you identify your allies not as people who are not Islamists, who are anti-Islamists, but people are moderate Islamists, whatever that is, it will fail. Those are Islamists we offended because you are basically implying that the kind of faith they practice is diluted diet Islam.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. That is a very important point.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. And those who are not Islamists, who are anti-Islamists will be offended because once you identify your allies as moderate Islamists they are going to say American has dropped us. They are interested in making alliances with Islamists, and not us. So I think it should be very clear that our allies are Muslims are not Islamists as opposed to Muslims who are Islamists.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yes, Doctor.

Mr. FRADKIN. What I have to say will start with from what Soner just said. I already hear from Muslim friends that they already feel that they are being isolated by our apparent willingness to engage with Islamists, and it makes their going very tough.

More generally, I wanted to report a remark of a Muslim friend of mine which responds, I think, to your question. He observed that if you are not a radical, if you are not a salafist, let alone a jihadist, then you are a traditional Muslim, and it is the way you and your family have lived for hundreds of years. You do not wake up in the morning thinking you have to sort of define that, or ex-

plain it, or argue for it, and that is perfectly natural. It is just your tradition and the way you lived.

The unfortunate part of that is that in the present circumstances people do need to do that, otherwise they are basically confronted with radicals who are telling them constantly that they are not good Muslims, even if they are living exactly the way that their families have lived for 300–400 years.

So the problem is if that was the kind of Islam, for example, that we—just looking at it from our point of view—wanted to live with, we could live with. How does that defend itself against people who are going around saying that in—a fashion that we find in other religious troops—that they are not orthodox enough so to speak, and that is not—whatever that would be it doesn't exist yet, and that is what one would have to look to, and I will leave it at that.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I have two questions or comments that flow out of your comments. One is, again, and again this is not a condemnation of any kind, Mr. Simon, but the use of language and what I hear you saying is, and tell me if this is acceptable in your view in the Muslim world, Muslims who are Islamists versus non-Islamists, are traditional Islam, traditional Muslims?

Mr. FRADKIN. People who have lived their traditional life.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Instead of a moderate or secular labeling?

Mr. FRADKIN. Right, they just think of themselves as Muslims.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Yes, the second issue would be though what compels the ongoing choice for preserving that world view? You pointed out some thing, our humanitarian efforts, perhaps more engagement, direct engagement in the Palestinian question would be helpful. Any other suggestions?

Mr. BLANKLEY. Well, I don't advocate this but in some sense Sunnis, as I understand it, judge their goodness as Muslims depending on—is Allah blessing them based on their position. Are they in charge? Are they prospering? Somewhat like Protestantism in America at the time of our founding. Benjamin Franklin, et cetera, believing that if you are a prosperous person, that you are being a good Christian and God was giving you his blessings.

So the condition that they find themselves in of being out of power and poor is evidence perhaps that they are not performing adequately, and that can drive for the reform, which is back to literalism, and perhaps into the violence that we want to get away from.

So to some extent, if you can empower them and have them see that they are succeeding and prospering, that is one thing. Now, in Iraq, that is a problem because the Sunnis are not going to likely in a democratic process be back in charge and that will be evidence to them that they are not being sufficiently good Muslims, and they will turn to even more violence.

So I don't know how you get there, but certainly that is an element of self-esteem that generates a sense that they don't have to go further into reform as they might consider it.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I think language is important as you said because in the current struggle many Islamists are trying to portray the ongoing struggle as America versus Islam, which is how we are going to lose this if that is how it stays. I think the idea is to make this look as America versus Islamists. America with Muslims against

Islamists, those Muslims who are against Islamists. That is why I think the terms is not just semantics, but it actually has bearing in the Muslim world, and I think the U.S. policy should reflect that choice of words. How so?

What can be done? I think we can study this by looking at what Islamists are doing to promote their cause and to replicate that on the other side of the aisle. So if Islamists are funding free Islamist education across the Muslim world because they have billions of dollars, you fund good free secular education across the Muslim world. If Islamists are funding that kind of media, you fund not Islamists media. If Islamists are funding that kind of political party, you fund non-Islamist political parties. You support them. You do exchanges, and I think in this regard, some people argue the similarities looking at how the Cold War was won, through massive amount of both intellectual and financial investment in Western Europe, support of pro-Western forces could set up examples of how to win this now across the Muslim countries.

Honestly, it seems to me that the effort that is being put by Islamists, what I called earlier Islamists international, in promoting this cause of jihad and struggle and terrorism and anti-Americanism is not being replicated at all across the aisle with the forces of secularism or Muslim Islamists. They are not getting one hundredth of the support that Islamists are getting across the world. They are not getting one hundredth support that we should be giving them.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Did you have something else to add?

Mr. SIMON. Please.

Mr. FRADKIN. I am going to suggest something along the lines that falls in with what Tony Blankley has said before. If you look at the main orientation of the radicals, what is a kind of first premise is that we Muslims are responsible for the situation that we are in now because we have failed our faith, we have been inadequate to our predecessors, the virtuous ancestors, and I would say this much about that.

There is something to that in the sense that the Muslim world as a whole as a political force became weak before the West became strong, and in fact it is not the case, if I may qualify what was said before, that the West or any part of it was always attacking the Muslim world, the Muslim world was far more powerful than anything in the West for 1,000 years, and that fact is very much on their minds to such an extent that it appears in speeches.

For example, Mahmoud Ahmajinejad, his famous speech threatening to wipe Israel off the map was hardly about Israel at all. It was really about the struggle between Islam and its adversary, namely the West, and there he had kind of a very strict chronological view of things. They were winning for 1,000 years. We have been waiting for 300. You have to reverse it.

I think it would be very important for that claim to be examined by Muslims by themselves. Whether it is intellectuals, whether it is theologians, whether it is historians, or even at a more popular level what exactly did go to a formula that was popular awhile ago, what did go wrong, and by the way, what went right, and what are the facts of Muslim history, and to encourage a kind of real self-examination because what really dominates, the major orientation

is just sort of a kind of outward blame. There is no attempt to look at the Muslim world, its pluses, its minuses, its problems with a view to what could be a real solution.

There are two solutions on offer. One is Islam, that is the slogan, and the other is to get rid of us. So long as that is the alpha and omega of reflection the kind of thing you were looking for before, Congressman Pence, will find it hard to emerge.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, it is made particularly complicated by the new media age that we are in that creates transnationalism very, very immediately.

Mr. FRADKIN. Yes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And empowers—well, perhaps oftentimes give a very false impression of the West and our intention. A few years ago I understand the most popular television show in the world was Baywatch. So here you have this image of a materialistic kind of culture being constantly sent into areas where those traditions would be offended. Yet at the same time it is kind of popular. It is kind of odd, but nonetheless that is real, and so the challenge that you have laid out is obviously very sincere but also very deep.

I appreciate all of you gentlemen being with us today.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I appreciate what the Chairman said. That Baywatch is pretty interesting. I think there was about 72 virgins would be watching it.

Let me first plead guilty to secular. I don't think secular has anything to do with being anti-religion or anti-people who are religious. To the opposite, I think it means that you are tolerant of all views, all religious views, not just selected ones, and the views of people who might not be religious, and I don't see too many people busting through the borders of any country that is not a secular country to try to take up residency, and to live there.

I have an action question and that is, you know, what do we do, and it is predicated on a belief that I have that indeed, as was said here, words and nuances are very important, but actions are much more important because people understand that and believe that a lot more because there is no hypocrisy to it. It is there if you are doing it for whatever the reasons.

This is a zero sum game, although everybody can stand to gain if we changed the rules. Right now it is if I win or you win. I think we have made some mistakes. I think the way both we and the Israelis handled Hamas rather rougher than Fatah, could have been a lot better if you have somebody like Abu Mazon from Fatah at least talking the language of peace and solving things through dialogue. That is a whole different direction than they saw in the Palestinian sectors, and we should have rushed in to put a lot of money in his hands so that he could give out the goodies because when he had the election it was either Fatah was going to win or Hamas was going to win. And if it is between the terrorists and the crooks, I am with the crooks. Someone was going to win the election, and we didn't put a bet down there, and that bet should have been made early.

The same thing that Hamas does to become popular, Hezbollah does to be popular, we saw it in Lebanon, you become the social service agency when government is corrupt. You become the people who helped my family, who feed my children, who take care of my

elderly parents, and you have earned my sympathy, certainly if not my undying gratitude and support because you become the provider because the government does not act in loco parentis or to motivate me to grow up.

We have not learned that. I mean, it was like, wow, watching after the Israelis institute the cease fire to see the Hezbollah guy out there handing out—you need a house, here is \$12,000. You need a house, here is—maybe we should have hired that guy for FEMA. I mean, you know, what better indication that you can deliver the services that people need than delivering the services that people need. We are not doing it.

Turkey becomes a critical example. If we are looking for an example, and our strategy in Iraq, which I alluded to earlier, was somebody bombed us and we are going to kick somebody's butt because of it, and we picked the wrong one to kick maybe arguably, you know, the Arab world and the Muslim world look at it and say, well, you know, they were bombed because of this by those people, and they are now doing whatever over in Iraq because all Muslims are the same, and we are all being punished and whatever, whatever.

We should be rushing into places that need help and providing help. We have been all stick and no carrot, and I think if you want to win the hearts and minds of people, it is not necessarily by battering them or kicking them or grabbing them by the sensitives, but by feeding their children, and I think if you feed their children, they know that you are for real. And I think that if this is a war of ideas, which it really, really is, then you have to capture somebody's attention before you can explain your idea, and let them know who you really and truly are. Because we think they are somebody else, they believe we are somebody else, and I think that we have to change our perspective, not that we give up and rollover and don't fight when we have to fight—I am not for that—but I think we have to prove ourselves in the Islamic world. We have not begun really to do that, and I maybe brief, very brief.

Mr. BLANKLEY. Let me just make a very brief response. I am not—not that it matters, but I am not against that if it would work. I mean, if anything works, it is what we should support. But if you look at the experience at Britain where the terrorists, and I met with the head Scotland Yard last week discussing how he saw the problems developing in Britain, both of July 7th of last year and so much as they know of the current crop regarding the airline effort, these were overwhelmingly middle class, not excluded from British society, decent educations, decent jobs. Ideology had got the better of them.

It is not to say that material won't help, and obviously it is intuitive to think that poverty is a breeding ground for all kinds of ideological exploitations, whether it was after the inflation in Germany or the Nazis. So it is not against it. But the point is to think that ideology and faith are not playing a very grabbing role in winning these hearts and minds for the other side I think is to ignore the power of faith.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Tony, I used to believe that a lot until very, very recently, and I was very puzzled by how they are getting these kids who are from families that are more upwardly mobile than the gen-

eral view that we had of who these people are who blow themselves up, and I think we have to change our focus. It is not about the individual. It is about the collective sometimes, and they feel very connected and very part of their group. It is not them but they are soul, their conscious, their being, their identity has been humiliated, doesn't have jobs, not that they don't have a job.

Some of the greatest fighters in the history of this Congress for the downtrodden and the poor have been the wealthiest people in this country. That is their view and their mission. It is not about them. It is about "the us" and the greater part of who they are from.

I think this is part of an ideology. It is not just about a part of an individual who is impoverished but whose people are suffering, and I think we have to somehow back up a little bit and address that bigger picture, and you have to do that, I think, by examples. I think you have to shower those who have the easiest possibilities of succeeding, the Turkeys of the world, and there aren't many, to that kind of a position, and I think some of the unlikely cases that have thought of before such as the Palestinians might be a good case for that if we think it out and do it the right way. So instead of it being a bad example that inspires the terrorists, they become a good example for what people can become with the right kind of attention from the world.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mr. Cagaptay.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very briefly on this issue of secular.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. We are going to have to conclude soon.

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I will be very brief therefore.

On this issue of secularism, I agree with—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Terrorists from some other committee even.
[Laughter.]

Mr. CAGAPTAY. I will be brief. I agree with you, Congressman, that we are not making a choice between those who are secular and who are Muslims because I think as it happens there are no Islamists in the Muslim world who are seculars, and there are many who are not Islamists and are also secular. So those who are secular, those who live in a secular lifestyle are clearly our allies because they form the backbone of this movement of anti-Islamism in the Muslim world.

To the question of action and what can be done, I think what we ought to do is do what Islamists are doing, and do it better, and fund what Islamists are funding, and fund it with more means if we are to have an impact on this ongoing struggle as the way Muslim countries are being homogenized with this both radically utopian ideology as well as with cash and arms and violence attitudes coming from certain countries.

Just to tie up, this is where Turkey really becomes important because what Turkey has done for such a long time was to promote this idea of a secular society which can also be Muslim in its culture and that there will be no contradiction or conflict between the two, and the more that is being endangered by what is going on in Turkey the more I am tempted to say that this is the example that we are trying to create, or this is the sample that we hope to see and it would be sad to see this example go down the drain.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, thank you, sir, for those comments. Sometimes in smaller hearings it actually gives us the opportunity to probe things in depth that we would not have had a chance to do otherwise, so I think this has been extraordinarily fruitful. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman, the Ranking Member, for your insightful comments. Mr. Blakely as well, and this is a very good example of something that appears irreconcilable but yet if we probe a little bit there might be some common ground.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming today, your sacrifice of time. Your work is obviously very, very important to us and must be deeply meaningful to you. Thank you for what you do.

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

